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Abstract
This paper applies a value-based management framework to critically review empirical
research in managerial accounting. This framework enables us to place the exceptionally
diverse set of managerial accounting studies from the past several decades into an
integrated structure. Our synthesis highlights the many consistent results in prior research,
identifies remaining gaps and inconsistencies, discusses common methodological and
econometric problems, and suggests fruitful avenues for future managerial accounting
research.
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1. Introduction

The past two decades have witnessed considerable change in managerial accounting
practice. From its traditional emphasis on financially-oriented decision analysis and
budgetary control, managerial accounting has ev olv ed to encompass a more strategic
approach that emphasizes the identification, measurement, and management of the key
fmancial and operational driv ers of shareholder value (International Federation of
Accountants, 1998; Institute of Management Accountants, 1999). A similar evolution
has occurred in managerial accounting research. Empirical studies of budgeting and
fmancial control practices are giving way to research on a variety of "new" techniques
such as activity-based costing, the balanced scorecard, strategic accounting and control
systems, and economic value performance measures.
Although researchers generally treat these techniques as distinct, companies
increasingly are integrating these various practices using a comprehensive ''value-based
management" (hereafter VBM) framework. This approach focuses on (1) defining and
implementing strategies that provide the highest potential for shareholder value creation;
(2) implementing information systems focused on value creation and the underlying
"drivers" ofvalue across a company 's business units, products, and customer segments;
(3) aligning management processes, such as business planning and resource allocation,
with value creation; and (4) designing performance measurement systems and incentive
compensation plans that reflect value creation (KPMG Consulting, 1999;
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999).

This paper applies a value-based management framework to critically review
empirical research in managerial accounting. Given the breadth of managerial
accounting research methods and topics, it is impossible for a single paper to adequately
summarize the entire field. Instead, we limit our review to organization-level studies that
use archival or survey data to examine issues related to the VBM perspective. These
criteria lead us to exclude most behavioral research, experimental studies, and qualitative
case research. We also exclude much of the compensation literature, which is covered in
comprehensive review papers by Pavlik et al. ( 1993), Murphy (1998), and Bushman and
Smith (this issue), among others.
We adopt the VBM framework for three reasons.1 First, VBM represents an
extension of traditional management planning and control frameworks (e.g., Anthony,
1965) and contingency theories of managerial accounting system design (e.g., Gordon
and M iller, 1976; Hayes, 1977; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980), and is
consistent with economic models of managerial accounting practices. This evolutionary
link allows us to apply evidence from several decades of research to the study of
contemporary practices. Second, the VBM perspective explicitly incorporates a wide
variety of recent " innovations" in managerial accounting practice, such as activ ity-based
costing and the balanced scorecard, that are ignored in many managerial accounting
frameworks. Third, analytical and empirical research in managerial accounting tends to
be motivated by changes in practice. By focusing on an emerging trend in managerial
accounting (KPMG Consulting, 1999; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999), we attempt to
1

The value-based management framework used in this paper is an adaptation of similar frameworks
developed by a number of accounting and consulting firms. For discussions of the value-based
management frameworks developed by Deloitte & Touche, McKinsey & Co., KPMG Peat Marwick, and

provide insight into the applicability and benefits of the normative VBM framework, and
to identify fruitful avenues for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 outlines the
simple value-based management framework used to guide our review, and discusses the
framework's links to other conceptual models and economic theories in the managerial
accounting literature. Section 3 offers our overall assessment of empirical research in
managerial accounting. Section 4 critically reviews studies relating to each step in the
value-based management process and identifies potential research topics. Section 5
discusses our views on the steps needed to advance empirical managerial accounting
research in the future. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
2. Overview of the Value-Based Management Approach

2.1 The E volution in Managerial A ccounting Practices
The value-based management approach represents an extension of more than four
decades of managerial accounting research and practice. According to the International
Federation of Accountants ( 1998), the recent emphasis on value-based management is the
fourth evolutionary step in managerial accounting. Prior to 1950, the primary focus of
managerial accounting practice was cost determination and financial control, through the
use of budgeting and cost accounting systems. By the mid-1960s, this focus shifted to
the provision of information for management planning and control. This second stage
was epitomized by Anthony's (1965) management control framework. Anthony
described management control as the process for ensuring that resources are obtained and
used effectively and efficiently to achieve the organization's objectives. His framework

PricewaterhouseCoopers, see Dixon and Hedley ( 1997), Copeland et al. ( 1996); KPMG Consulting (1999),
and Black et al. (1998), resp ectively .

clearly distinguished management control from strategic planning and operational
control, thereby limiting the scope of managerial accounting responsibilities and focusing
primary attention on accounting information (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 1999).
Contingency theories expanded the management planning and control framework by
articulating some of the contextual or " contingent" factors influencing the entire
organizational control "package" of accounting and non-accounting information systems,
organizational design, and other control mechanisms (e.g., Gordon and Miller, 1976;
Hayes, 1977; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980). These theories contend that
there is no universally applicable system of management accounting and control--the
choice of appropriate accounting and control techniques depends upon the circumstances
surrounding an organization. Among the prominent contingent factors in this literature
are the external environment (e.g., simple vs. complex; static vs. dynamic), technology
(e.g., job shop to mass production; production interdependencies; automation),
competitive strategy and mission (e.g., low cost vs. innovation), business unit and
industry characteristics (e.g., size, diversification, firm structure, regulation), and
knowledge and observability factors (e.g., knowledge of the transformation process;
outcome observability; behav ior observability) (Fisher, 1995).
Beginning in the mid-1980s, managerial accounting began shifting away from a strict
focus on planning and control to emphasize the reduction of waste in business processes.
This shift was prompted by the growing adoption of quality management programs, as
well as the introduction of accounting techniques such as cost of quality measurement,
activity-based costing, process value analysis, and strategic cost management (e.g.,
Cooper and Kaplan, 1991; Shank and Govindarajan, 1994).

By the mid-1990s, managerial accounting entered its fourth stage, with the focus on
planning and control and waste reduction expanding to encompass a more strategic
emphasis on the creation of firm value through the identification, measurement, and
management of the drivers of customer value, organizational innovation, and shareholder
returns. A hallmark of this era is the introduction of a diverse set of "new" managerial
accounting techniques focused on promoting value creation. These techniques include
the development of balanced scorecards of leading and lagging indicators of economic
success (e.g., Kaplan and N orton, 19%), economic value measures that are claimed to
approximate shareholder returns (e.g., Stewart, 1991), and strategic management
accounting systems that provide information concerning the current and expected states
of strategic uncertainties (e.g., Bromwich, 1990; Simons, 1991).

2.2 The Value-Based Management Framework
The value-based management approach builds on the preceding practices to provide
an integrated framework for measuring and managing businesses, with the explicit
objective of creating superior long-term value for shareholders (Dixon and Hedley, 1993;
Copeland et al., 1996; KPMG Consulting, 1999; Black et al., 1998). Although VBM
frameworks vary somewhat from firm to firm, they generally include six basic steps. As
shown in Figure 1, these steps include:
1. Choosing specific internal objectives that lead to shareholder value enhancement.

2. Selecting strategies and organizational designs consistent with the achievement of the
chosen objectives.
3. Identifying the specific performance v ariables, or ''value drivers," that actually create
value in the business given the organization' s strategies and organizational design.
4. Developing action plans, selecting performance measures, and setting targets based
on the priorities identified in the value driver analysis.

5. Evaluating the success of action plans and conducting organizational and managerial
performance evaluations.
6. Assessing the ongoing validity of the organization's internal objectives, strategies,
plans, and control systems in light of current results, and modifying them as required.

*** Figure 1 about here ***
The simple sequential VBM framework (like all organizational design frameworks) is
an abstraction of the complex interdependencies, simultaneous choices, and feedback
loops found in practice. However, it prov ides a useful mechanism for categorizing
empirical studies in managerial accounting (which typically assume a similar sequential
process) and for assessing the extent to which this research supports the associations
discussed in the normative VBM literature. More importantly, the framework captures
many of the linkages highlighted in contingency theories, principal-agent models (see
Baiman [1990] and Lambert [this issue] for reviews), and economics-based
organizational design frameworks (e.g., Brickley et al., 1997a; Milgrom and Roberts,
1992; Jensen, 1998). Figures 2 and 3, for example, illustrate representative economic and
contingency frameworks developed by Brickley et al. (1995) and Otley (1980),
respectively. Although the specific terminology and placement of variables vary
somewhat, each framework suggests that managerial accounting and control should be
viewed as a complete organizational control package consisting of accounting
information systems, performance measurement and reward systems, and organizational
design, with the choice and performance consequences of these practices a function of the
firm 's external environment, organizational objectives, and strategies. The VBM
framework extends these ideas to highlight the identification of the firm 's financial and

non-financial value drivers, and the feedback loop from performance to the subsequent
reassessment of objectives, strategies, and organizational design and control.

*** Figures 2 and 3 about here ***

3. General Observations on Empirical Research in Managerial Accounting
In reviewing the studies for this paper, a number of notable features struck our

attention, including the practice-oriented nature of this research, the extent to which the
studies' topics correspond to the latest management fads, and the diversity in samples,
research methods, and theories used by researchers.
Perhaps the most striking feature is the extent to which the research is driven by
changes in practice (albeit with some lag).

The focus on emerging trends offers

advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it produces a diverse set of interesting
papers that are better aligned with the interests of practitioners and the material covered
in most contemporary managerial accounting textbooks. In our view, this alignment is
desirable, and has helped overcome some of the criticisms in the 1980s and early 1990s
that managerial accounting research had become irrelev ant and no longer reflected the
concerns of managers.
On the other hand, it has produced a faddish nature to the managerial accounting
literature. Many papers are motivated purely by the fact that a certain topic has received
considerable attention in the business press, with little effort to place the practice or study
within some broader theoretical context. An example is early cost driver studies, which
were motivated by claims in practitioner-oriented activity-based costing and operations

management articles, rather than economic, operations research, or behavioral theories
(see Dopuch [ 1993] for a critique of cost driver studies).
Research topics also tend to disappear as the next big managerial accounting
"innovation" appears, even though earlier "hot" topics may not have been fully explored.
An excellent example is research at the interface of accounting and operations

management.

Beginning with Kaplan's (1983) call for greater emphasis on

manufacturing performance measurement, considerable enthusiasm for research on this
topic emerged in the managerial accounting community.

Two research conferences

sponsored by Harvard Business School resulted in widely cited books containing papers
by leading researchers from North America and Europe (Bruns and Kaplan, 1987;
Kaplan, 1990). Journals such as Accounting, Organizations and Society, The A ccounting

Review, Journal of A ccounting and Economics, and Journal of Accounting Research
published papers on manufacturing performance measurement, incentives in advanced
manufacturing environments, and production economics.

Yet, despite the initial

enthusiasm, the advent of "new" topics such as the balanced scorecard, intangible assets,
and economic v alue added has substantially reduced research at the interface of
accounting and operations management. 2 Instead, we are left with an underdeveloped
body of research that fails to build on prior studies to increase our understanding of the

2

Brickley et al. (1997b) document a similar pattern of interest in ''innovative" management techniques in
the business press. For example, interest in just-in-time manufacturing peaked in the late 1980s, while
interest in total quality management began to wane in the early 1990s. In their place, press coverage began
emphasizing activity-based costing and reengineering. By 1997, interest in these tw o topics also began to
decline, this time in favor of articles on economic value added. The declining interest in advanced
manufacturing practices in the business press is likely to explain much of the topic's declining interest in
the managerial accounting community. Another factor may be greater access to funding and research sites
when research topics are perceived to be new or innovative.

topic, leaves many important research topics unexplored3 , and lacks the critical mass of
related studies needed to reconcile conflicting results or to reach consensus on the
performance benefits from various manufacturing performance measurement practices. 4
One factor making it difficult to generalize results from managerial accounting
studies is the diversity in samples, research methods, and theories used by researchers.
This div ersity has a number of causes. One of the primary causes is differences in the
theoretical disciplines used to motivate managerial accounting studies. Unlike capital
markets research, which is based almost exclusively on financial economics theories,
managerial accounting research draws from a wide variety of disciplines, including
economics, psychology, sociology, and operations research. 5 This variety is due in part
to the fact that much of the empirical research in managerial accounting is conducted
outside of North America.

While North American universities tend to emphasize

economics in their doctoral programs and research, many universities in other parts of the
world place greater emphasis on behavioral disciplines such as organizational behavior
and sociology . This behav ioral focus is reflected in our citations, with significantly more
references from the behav iorally-oriented European journal Accounting, Organizations,

and Society than from leading economics-oriented North American journals.
Another factor contributing to the diversity in managerial accounting research is the
lack of publicly-available data.

3

Whereas financial accounting and executive

Young and Selto's (1991) review of the advanced manufacturing literature identified a variety of research
topics for accounting researchers. A number of these, such as cost of quality measurement and life cycle
costing, have received virtually no attention in leading accounting j ournals.
4
Perhaps the only managerial accounting topics that have received enough attention to perform true metaanalyses of results are executive compensation and participative budgeting, neither of which is covered in
any detail in this review. See Greenberg et al. (1994) for a meta-analysis of the participative budgeting
literature.
5
See Shields ( 1997) for an analysis of the theoretical bases used in managerial accounting research during
the 1990s.

compensation researchers can obtain data from financial statements, firm disclosures, and
data bases such as Compustat, CRSP, Execucomp, and I/B/E/ S, public information on
managerial accounting practices or adoption dates is rarely available.

Instead,

researchers must conduct surveys usmg instruments that tend to v ary somewhat from
study to study, obtain data from third parties such as consulting firms, or gather
company-specific archival data from research sites. The broad set of data sources allows
managerial accounting studies to avoid the narrow focus that sometimes occurs when
researchers are constrained by the availability of public data (e.g., the over-emphasis on
executives in compensation studies due to proxy disclosure requirements). However, the
heterogeneity in samples makes it difficult to compare findings, build on prior studies, or
assess the generalizability of the results.
We conduct our review against this background.

In the following sections, we

attempt to categorize and summarize the diverse set of managerial accounting studies.
We follow this appraisal with our views on the steps required to advance empirical
research in managerial accounting as we go forward.
4.

Review of Empirical Research
Our rev iew is organized using the six value-based management steps in Figure 1. For

each step in the framework, we critically evaluate related empirical studies, identify
common limitations, and offer suggestions for future research.

4.1 The Choice ofOrganizational Objectives
A primary assumption in managerial accounting research is that the ultimate goal of
managerial accounting systems is prov iding the information and control mechanisms
needed to achieve organizational objectives. However, the choice of sp ecific

organizational objectives traditionally has been outside the scope of managerial
accounting research. This has changed with the advent of value-based management
approaches. In this section, we discuss these changes and assess research on the choice
of objectives in value-based management programs. We then prov ide a broader
perspective on research opportunities related to the choice and performance consequences
of organizational objectives.

4.1.1 Research on Value-Based Organizational Objectives
Many VBM advocates contend that an organization's primary objectives must be
stated in terms of "economic value" measures, such as economic value added (EVA) and
cash flow return on investment (CFROI), in order to align internal goals with the
maximization of shareholder value (e.g., Copeland et al., 1996; Stem et al. 1995; KPMG
6

Consulting, 1999). This contention is based on assertions that changes in economic
value measures track changes in shareholder wealth more closely than traditional
accounting measures, and should therefore replace accounting measures for goal setting,
capital budgeting, and compensation purposes (Stern et al., 1995). Claims that economic
value measures are superior to traditional accounting measures are not limited to
consultants and the business press. Analytical studies by Anctil (1996), Rogerson ( 1997),

6

The foundations for these "new" economic value measures are residual income and internal rate of return
concepts developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Stem Stewart & Co.'s trademarked "Economic Value Added"
or EVA® measure, for example, is the firm' s proprietary adaptation of residual income. EVA is defined as
adjusted operating income minus a capital charge. Common adjustments to compute EVA include
modifications to the deferred income tax reserve, the LIFO reserve, the treatment of intangible assets such
as research and development and advertising, and goodwill amortization. CFROI is similar to the longterm internal rate of return, calculated by dividing inflation-adjusted cash flow by the inflation-adjusted
cash investment.

Reichelstein ( 1997), and others show how the use of residual income-based measures
such as EVA can ensure goal congruence between the principal and agent. 7
Much of the support for the claimed superiority of economic value measures is based
on relatively unsophisticated studies examining the relation between market measures
(e.g., market value or shareholder returns) and EVA. Simple univariate tests by
Milunovich and Tseui ( 1996) and Lehn and Makhija ( 1997) find market-value added
more highly associated with EVA than with accounting returns, earnings per share,
earnings per share growth, return on equity, free cash flow, or free cash growth. O'Byrne
(1996) uses regression models to examine the association between market value and two
performance measures: EVA and net operating profit after tax (NOPAT). Both measures
have similar explanatory power when no control variables are included in the regression
models, but a modified EVA model has greater explanatory power when industry
indicator variables and the logarithm of capital for each firm are included as additional
explanatory variables. Howev er, O 'Byrne (1996) does not make similar adjustments to
the NOPAT model, making it impossible to compare results using the different measures.
More sophisticated analyses are less conclusive. Chen and Dodd ( 1997) examine the
explanatory power of accounting measures (earnings per share, return on assets, and
return on equity), residual income, and various EVA-related measures. Although the
EVA measures outperform accounting earnings in explaining stock returns, the earnings
measures provide significant incremental explanatory power above EVA. The authors
also find the explanatory power of the EVA measures far lower than claimed by
proponents.

7

See Brom wich and Walker (1 998) for a review of theoretical papers on the strengths and weaknesses of
value-based management approaches based on residual income measures such as EVA.

Biddle et al. (1997) use contemporary capital markets research techniques to examine
the power of accounting measures (earnings and operating profits) to explain stock
market returns relative to EVA and five components of EVA (cash flow from operations,
operating accruals, after-tax interest expense, capital charge, and accounting
adjustments). In contrast to less sophisticated studies, Biddle et al. ( 1997) find that
traditional accounting measures generally outperform EVA in explaining stock prices.
While the EVA measure's capital charges and adjustments for accounting "distortions"
have some incremental explanatory power over traditional accounting measures, the
contribution from these variables is not economically significant in their tests.
Even if economic v alue measures have a stronger statistical relation with stock
returns, it is not clear that these measures are preferable for management planning and
control purposes. Analytical research by Gjesdal (1981) and Paul (1992) shows that an
information system that is useful for valuing the firm need not be useful in assessing a
manager's performance, making the correlation between a performance measure and
stock returns irrelevant when choosing objectives. Similarly, Zimmerman (1997)
discusses how divisional EVA measures may be highly misleading indicators of value
creation and may provide the wrong incentives, even if corporate EVA closely tracks
changes in stock price. Garvey and Milbourn (2000), on the other hand, dev elop a model
showing that the correlation between EVA and stock returns is a relevant factor in the
choice of performance measures. They empirically test this model by examining whether
the adoption of EVA for compensation purposes is positively related to the statistical
association between the fum's economic value added and stock returns. Their results
support this hypothesis, leading the authors to conclude that the correlation between

performance measures and stock returns is a useful input into the choice of internal
objectiv es.
The mixed results in these studies raise an important question: Do organizations
using economic value measures as their primary objectives for planning and control
purposes achieve superior performance? Again, the evidence is mixed. Wallace ( 1997)
examines relative performance changes in 40 adopters of residual income-based
compensation measures such as EVA and a matched sample of non-users. Compared to the
control fnms, residual income fnms decrease new inv estments, increase payouts to
shareholders through share repurchases, and utilize assets more intensively, leading to
significantly greater change in residual income. Wallace (1997) also finds weak evidence
that stock market participants respond favorably to the adoption of residual income-based
compensation plans.
Wallace's (1997) study examines changes in performance rather than performance

levels, and only examines performance changes over one year. Hogan and Lewis (1999)
extend his study by investigating performance changes over a four year period, and by
matching control firms on p ast performance to control for possible mean reversion in
performance levels. They find that adopters of residual income measures are relatively poor
performers prior to the compensation plans ' implementation, and that the improved stock
returns and operating performance reported by Wallace ( 1997) may not be unique to
economic value adopters. After introducing past profitability as an additional matching
criteria, they fmd no significant difference in the stock price or operating performance of
their two groups, and conclude that economic value plans are no better in their ability to

create shareholder wealth than traditional plans blending earnings-based bonuses and stockbased compensation.

4.1.2 Limitations and Research Opportunities
Perhaps the biggest limitation in the preceding studies is the use of publicly
available data on EVA values and uses. Studies of EVA's predictive ability typically
employ published EVA data estimated by the consulting firm Stem Stewart. However,
these numbers are computed using public financial data, and contain relatively few of the
accounting adjustments EVA proponents encourage companies to make to more closely
approximate "economic profits." 8 This may understate the value of the measures since
the published figures exclude the detailed firm-specific adjustments Stem Stewart and
other consultants perform for their clients (Garvey and Milbourn, 2000). It also is
unclear whether the estimated EVA figures are even appropriate for firms that have not
implemented EVA systems.
A second limitation from the use of public data is the primary focus on EVAbased compensation for executives, rather than other uses such as capital budgeting or
lower-level compensation that may be harder to identify from public sources. Although
Stern et al. ( 1995) argue that effective implementation ofEVA requires firms to make this
measure the cornerstone of a total management system that focuses on EVA for capital
budgeting, goal setting, investor communication, and compensation, surveys suggest that
the majority ofEVA and VBM adopters continue to place heavy emphasis on traditional
accounting objectives for various purposes (KPMG Consulting, 1999). Furthermore, the
8

Stern Stewart recommends up to 160 adjustments that firms can make to more closely approximate
"economic profits." Common adjustments include modifications to the deferred income tax reserve, the
LIFO reserve, the treatment of intangible assets such as research and development and advertising, and
goodwill amortization (see Stewart [1991, 113-117] for other recommended adjustments). Stern Stewart's

majority of firms adopting economic value measures do not use the measures in incentive
plans (Ittner and Larcker, 1998a), suggesting that studies focused on EVA-based
compensation plans identify only a small fraction ofEVA users.
Research to date has also emphasized the value relevance of EVA or other
residual income-based economic value measures, despite surveys finding substantial use
of cashflow-based measures such as CFROI in value-based management programs
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). Considerable debate exists over the relative ability of
different economic value measures (EVA, CFROI, or variants of these measures) to
predict stock returns, with many consulting firms claiming that their economic value
measures are far better indicators of value creation than EVA (Myers, 1996; The

Economist, 1996). Researchers can examine the circumstances under which the
alternative value-based measures are more predictive of stock returns than EVA or
traditional accounting measures, and the potential factors (e.g., competitive environment,
environmental uncertainty, and product or industry life cycle) explaining any crosssectional differences in predictiv e ability.
A final issue is whether shareholder wealth maximization should drive the choice
of internal objectives. Many firms believe that a broader " stakeholder" approach to
organizational objectives is preferred to a single-minded focus on shareholders.

9

The

VBM adopters surveyed by KPMG Consulting ( 1999) rated customers their most
important stakeholders (with shareholders second and employees third), and customer

publicly available database makes an unspecified "handful" of standard adjustments, and excludes filmspecific adjustments made for its clients.
9
The adoption of a stakeholder approach need not be inconsistent with shareholder wealth creation.
Berman et al. (1999), for example, argue that concern for multiple stakeholders (e.g., employees,
customers, community, and the environment) may be motivated by the perception that this approach
improves financial performance, rather than a moral commitment to the stakeholder groups. Their
empirical tests provide some support for this proposition.

satisfaction their second most important corporate goal (behind profits but ahead of stock
returns and economic value measures). Despite these differing perspectives, relatively
little is known about the effects of different objectiv es on strategic choices,
organizational design, and firm performance. Thus, an important question is whether the
choice of internal objectiv es actually influences corporate success. 10

4.2 Strategy Development and Organizational D esign Choices
Proponents of value-based management contend that the second step in the VBM
process is selecting specific strategies and organizational designs to achieve the chosen
objectives . This step is consistent with m any economics-based organizational design
framew orks and analytical models. Brickley et al. 's (1995) framework, for example,
suggests that a firm ' s " organizational architecture," including the assignment of decisionrights to employees, is directly influenced by the firm ' s fmancial and non-financial goals
and business strategy (see Figure 2). Similarly, Milgra m and Roberts (1995) model the
benefits from greater ''fit" between the firm 's strategy, organizational structure, and
management processes.
This section begins by rev iewing empirical studies on the relations among managerial
accounting practices, firm strategy, and operational strategies . Because this topic has
been comprehensively reviewed in earlier papers (e.g., Dent, 1990; Langfield-Smith,
1997), w e focus much of our attention on the measurement of strategy in empirical
studies. We then examine research on organizational design, an issue that has received
10

A related issue is the applicability of the value-based management framework in private and non-profit
organizations, which do not have shareholder value enhancement as an organizational objective. Despite
this difference in objectives, many non-profit organizations follow a similar planning and control process

more attention in analytical studies of managerial accounting practices than in empirical
studies. Using survey evidence from :fmancial services firms, we highlight some of the
limitations in these studies and suggest potential av enues for future research.

4.2. 1 Strategy and M anagerial Accounting Research
As with the choice of organizational objectiv es, the managerial accounting literature
generally takes strategy as giv en and examines the association betw een strategic choices
and the organization's accounting and control sy stem design. These studies typically
measure strategy as a continuum between firms following a " defender," "harvest," or
" cost leadership" strategy and firms following a "prospector," "build," or "innovation"
strategy (Dent, 1990; Langfield-Smith, 1997). As defined in the strategy literature, a
" defender," ''harvest," or " cost leadership" strategy focuses on being the low cost
producer of a narrow product range, while a "prospector," "build," or " innov ation"
strategy focuses on being first-to-market with a v ariety of innov ativ e products or services
(e.g., l\1iles and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1985). Although a useful indicator of organiz ational
strategy, this simple continuum misses the multi-dimensional nature of strategic choices.
Strategy researchers, for example, argue that viable strategies other than strict cost
leadership or innovation ex ist, such as providing higher quality than competitors,
differentiating products through image, superior customer service, or focus on a
particular m arket niche, or being more flexible in responding to customer demands or
copy ing competitors' innovations (Miles and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1985).
A related measure that is widely used in accounting research is "perceiv ed
environmental uncertainty" (or PEU ). The managerial accounting literature defines

(e.g., General Accounting Office, 1998). Thus, an interesting research issue is the benefits of this general
approach in publicly-traded companies relative to private or non-profit organizations.

environmental uncertainty as ( 1) lack of information regarding the environmental factors
affecting a given decision-making situation, (2) not knowing how much the organization
will lose if a specific decision is incorrect, and (3) the difficulty in assigning probabilities
w ith any degree of certainty as to how env ironmental factors are going to affect the
success or failure of a decision (Fisher, 1995). Research suggests that competitive
strategy and environmental uncertainty are related, with more innovative "prospector"
firms facing greater uncertainty than firms follow ing a cost leader or " defender" strategy
(Fisher, 1995). However, using perceived environmental uncertainty as a strategy proxy
is problematic. First, environmental uncertainty is likely to be influenced by many
factors other than strategy, including such exogenous factors as market competition,
technological changes, and political conditions. Second, using managers' percep tions of
environmental uncertainty rather than objective measures of env ironmental conditions
makes it difficult to discern which factors the managers considered when responding.
Other common proxies for strategy are publicly-disclosed information on research
and dev elopment expenditures and market-to-book ratios, which are assumed to reflect
the rrrm' s " growth opportunities" or the extent to which the firm follows an innovation
strategy . How ev er, measures such as these are likely to be noisy proxies for growth
opportunities or strategic choices. M arket-to-book ratios, for example, tend to v ary by
industry. Consequently, this measure may simply be picking up industry effects in large
cross-sectional studies, with little ability to distinguish strategy differences w ithin an
industry. Similarly, many firms do not report research and development expenditures,
even though they may still be innov ative along dimensions that are not captured in

research and development expenditures (e.g., product and process flexibility, distribution,
information technology, etc.).
Although the primary focus in managerial accounting studies is corporate or
business unit strategy, other studies examine lower-level operational strategies such as
just-in-time production, flexible manufacturing systems, and total quality management
(e.g., Daniel and Reitsperger, 1991; Banker et al., 1993; Young and Selto, 1993;
Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997; Perera et al., 1997; Sim and
Killough, 1998; Scott and Tiessen, 1999). These studies typically ignore the higher-level
strategic choices made by the firm, even though all of these choices are expected to
influence accounting and control system design and organizational performance. Most of
these studies also examine only one operational strategy at a time, despite evidence that
many companies simultaneously adopt multiple operational strategies (e.g., just-in-time
production in conjunction with total quality management).

11

4.2.2 Organizational Design in Managerial A ccounting Research
In contrast to the large body of analytical research on the optimal choice of
organizational design (e.g., Melumad et al., 1992; Baiman et al., 1995), relatively few
empirical studies examine the determinants of organizational design. Instead, empirical
studies often assume that some relation exists between organizational design choices
(e.g., decentralization, allocation of decision rights, or interdependencies) and strategy (or
perceived environmental uncertainty), and examine their interactive effect on control
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An exception is Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998), who use cluster analysis to examine the effects of
"bundles" of organizational prnctices (i.e., higher-level strategies, operntional strategies, and management
accounting techniques) on perceived performance. One limitation of this approach is the inability to
determine whether all of the practices used by high performing organizations are necessary, or whether
some of the practices provide greater performance benefits than others.

system design or performance. 12 An exception is Vancil' s (1978) early work on
decentralization. Using simple univariate statistical methods, Vancil finds diversification
strategies positively associated with the number of functions performed by a profit center
and the degree to which profit center managers have control over the assigned costs of
centralized operations.
More recent studies investigate the factors influencing the design of production
activ ities. Economic theories contend that successful adoption of advanced
manufacturing strategies requires simultaneous changes in organizational design and
managerial processes (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Wruck and Jensen, 1994).
Abernethy and Lillis (1995) examine these claims by testing the relation between the
adoption of flexible manufacturing systems and integrative liaison devices such as teams,
meetings, and task forces. Their simple correlation analyses indicate that the extent to
which organizations adopt a flexible manufacturing strategy is positively associated with
the use of these integrative devices. In contrast, Selto et al. (1995) report that production
worker authority in a manufacturing plant that adopted just-in-time production is not
statistically associated with task difficulty or variability or with the job's dependency on
workgroup involvement. However, the extent to which work is standardized is
negatively associated with task difficulty or v ariability and positively associated with the
job's dependency on the workgroup. Scott and Tiessen's (1999) results are also mixed,
with the proportion of time spent in inter-departmental teams increasing with
manufacturing task complexity, but having no relation with the number of organizational
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For examples of accmmting studies using organizational design characteristics as independent variables,
see Bruns and Waterhouse ( 1975), Hayes ( 1977); Larcker (1981 ), Scapen and Sale ( 1985), Chenhall and
Morris (1986), Govindarajan and Fisher (1990); Mia and Chenhall (1994), Chong (1996); Buslunan et al.
(1996), and Keating (1997).

levels in the plant or the extent of reciprocal relations among departments. Time spent in
intra-departmental teams, on the other hand, increases with more extensive reciprocal
relations, but falls with greater task complexity. Thus, the relation between
organizational design practices and manufacturing strategies remains unclear.

4.2.3 Limitations and Research Opportunities
One of the keys to improving research in this area is improving the measurement
of strategy . As discussed above, most studies measure this construct using a simple
continuum between firms following a cost leadership strategy and those following an
innovation or growth-oriented strategy. Given the multidimensional nature of corporate
strategy, a single measure is unlikely to capture many relevant strategic distinctions (e.g.,
innovative companies pursuing a niche or differentiation strategy versus those pursuing a
mass market strategy). Table 1 illustrates this problem using survey data we collected
from 148 financial service firms .

13

We asked senior executives from these firms to

evaluate 12 aspects of the company's organizational strategy and corporate environment
that are commonly used to measure strategy and perceived environmental uncertainty.
Principal components analysis (with oblique rotation) reveals three factors with
eigenvalues greater than one. 14 The factors capture the extent to which the firm's
strategy focuses on innovation (denoted INNOV), flexibility in changing its product and
service offerings and responding to market demands (denoted FLEX), and the pursuit of
existing customers and markets in predictable environments (denoted PREDICT). One
question asking whether the firm is more cost efficient than its competitors did not load
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The survey data on financial service firms were jointly collected by the authors and the Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young Center for Business Innovation.
14
Specific questions and their assignment to the three strategy constructs are provided in Table 1.

greater than 0.40 on any of the factors , even though this characteristic is generally
assumed to be a key strategic attribute. This question is dropped from the analysis.

*** Table 1 about here* **

Table 1 prov ides correlations among the three resulting constructs and the firm's
book-to-market ratio (denoted BTOM, a commonly used inverse measure of growth
opportunities). The correlations suggest that some of the strategic dimensions are not
independent. In particular, flexibility (FLEX) and product and service innovation
(INNOV) have a strong, positive correlation (two-tailed p < 0.001). Innovation and
market stability (PREDICT) also have a marginally significant positive correlation
(Pearson correlation= 0.14, two-tailed p = 0.09), not the negative association often
assumed in accounting research. In contrast, the book-to-market ratio is not significantly
correlated with any of the survey-based strategy proxies. Although the insignificant
associations with BTOM are due in part to the computation of book-to-market ratios in
fmancial service firms (where investments in securities are marked-to-market), this
evidence indicates that publicly available strategy proxies such as BTOM may not be
appropriate in all settings. Taken together, the principal components analysis and
correlations highlight the need to incorporate constructs that capture multiple strategic
dimensions, and to examine their individual and joint effects on managerial accounting
practices and firm performance.
Future studies can also examine whether objectives, strategies, and organizational
designs are simultaneously determined. Some economic theories suggest that these

choices should be made jointly (Brickley et al., 1997a; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995),
rather than sequentially as shown in the VBM framework. Most studies, on the other
hand, treat one or more of these decisions as exogenous, independent variables in their
empirical specifications. The typical approach is to assume a causal relation running
from strategy or organizational design to the design of managerial accounting and control
systems. How ever, the direction of causality may actually be opposite, with accounting
system design promoting or inhibiting the adoption of certain strategies (e.g., Dent, 1990;
Langfield-Smith, 1997). Additional research using simultaneous equations methods can
shed light on the actual direction of causality among these choices.
One important issue that has received almost no attention in empirical studies is
the effect of organizational objectives on the choice of strategies and organizational
design. VBM frameworks suggest that the choice of internal objectives should determine
the strategies and organizational designs adopted to achieve these objectives. Case study
research provides some support for this assertion. Studies by Baker and Wruck ( 1989)
and Wruck ( 1994) describe how increased leverage led their two case study sites to
modify internal objectives, decentralize decision-making, and reorganize manufacturing
processes. Similarly, Dial and Murphy (1995) discuss how the adoption of an explicit
corporate objective of increasing shareholder value led to changes in corporate strategy
and organization. Large-sample studies can extend these studies by examining the extent
to which changes in organizational objectives affect companies ' strategies and
organizational designs.
Finally, more research is needed on the determinants of organizational design
choices. Managerial accounting theory suggests that these choices are critical

components of the management control package (e.g., Melumad et al., 1992; Baiman et
al., 1995; Brickley et al., 1997a). Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the
factors influencing organizational design. Where these studies have been conducted, they
have been limited to a very small subset of the organizational choices made by the firm.
Empirical studies can extend this literature by testing the hypotheses generated by
managerial accounting theories, and determining whether the broad set of organizational
design choices are complements or substitutes for other management control practices.

4.3 Identification of Value Drivers
Agency models indicate that the goal of control systems is promoting congruence
between the actions taken by the agent and the actions desired by the principal. If the
principal's ultimate objective is maximizing shareholder value, these models suggest that
control systems should emphasize those actions that are expected to increase shareholder
returns. The value-based management process goes a step further by focusing on the
identification of the financial and operational ''value drivers" that lead to increased
shareholder value. Identification of these drivers and their interrelations is expected to
improve resource allocation, performance measurement, and the design of information
systems by identifying the specific actions or factors that cause costs to arise or revenues
to change. This section reviews three managerial accounting research streams that focus
on the identification and measurement ofvalue drivers: (1) activity-based costing (ABC),
(2) strategic cost management, and (3) the balanced scorecard.

4. 3. I Activity-Based Costing
Activity-based costing studies emphasize the ability of non-volume related measures
to predict overhead usage (Cooper and Kaplan, 1991). In doing so, this literature focuses

on how improved understanding of cost drivers can improve the allocation of overhead
and thereby improve decision-making. The ABC literature also highlights the role
increased understanding of cost driv ers can play in reducing "non-v alue-added" activities
that reduce efficiency while adding little or no v alue to the customer (also known as
activ ity-based management).
M ost value driver research to date has tested the ABC literature's claims that cost
drivers other than volume explain a significant proportion of ov erhead costs. Contrary to
these claims, Foster and Gupta's (1990) cross-sectional analysis of data from 37
manufacturing plants owned by one firm provides little ev idence that complexity or
efficiency-related variables explain overhead costs. In contrast, Banker et al. 's ( 1995)
cross-sectional study of 31 plants in three industries finds complex ity v ariables
significantly associated with overhead costs, even after controlling for direct labor costs
(a proxy for v olume). Banker and Johnston's (1993) cross-sectional analysis of the
airline industry yields similar results. Several longitudinal studies find significant
positive relations between overhead costs and non-volume cost drivers (Anderson, 1995;
Platt, 1996; Ittner et al., 1997; Fisher and Ittner, 1999), but the incremental explanatory
power from the non-volume measures generally is quite small.
Research has also examined other assumptions underlying the ABC concept. N oreen
and Soderstrom (1994) and M aher and Marais (1998) use data from hospitals to examine
whether overhead costs are proportional to activ ity . Their results suggest that ABC
systems that assume costs are strictly proportional to their drivers grossly overstate
relevant costs for decision-making and performance evaluation purposes. However, the
importance of this finding is unclear. Most managerial accounting textbooks discuss the

concept of the "relevant range." This concept maintains that cost functions are nonlinear, but that linear assumptions can still be appropriate within a relatively narrow range
of potential production or activity volumes. Thus, the extent to which the linear
assumptions embedded in ABC and other costing system harm decision-making remains
an open 1ssue.
MacArthur and Stranahan ( 1998) also use hospital data to investigate whether the
level of hospital complexity is simultaneously determined with the level of overhead
costs needed to support this complexity. Unlike most studies that assume complexity is
an exogenous determinant of overhead, MacArthur and Stranahan's (1998) analyses
indicate that these choices are jointly determined. In a similar vein, Datar et al. ( 1993)
examine interdependencies among cost drivers, which ABC approaches typically ignore.
Analysis of product-level data from one plant indicates that supervision, maintenance,
and scrap costs are simultaneously determined, leading the researchers to conclude that
failure to recognize this simultaneity results in inaccurate estimates of cost driver effects.
Ittner et al. (1997) investigate the descriptive validity and performance consequences
of Cooper and Kaplan's (1991) " overhead cost hierarchy." Principal components
analysis of a wide variety of manufacturing measures indicates that these measures
generally corresponded to the unit, batch, and product-sustaining categories proposed in
Cooper and Kaplan's (1991) cost hierarchy. However, activities related to the various
cost hierarchy levels are not independent, consistent with Datar et al. 's ( 1993) conclusion
that choices among cost drivers can be interdependent. In addition, any cost increases
from increased unit and product-sustaining activities tend to be offset by revenue

increases from higher sales volumes and greater product v ariety at their research site,
indicating that cost driv ers should not be examined in isolation from their revenue effects.

4.2.2 Strategic Cost Management and the B alanced Scorecard
The strategic cost management literature extends the ABC concept by focusing not
only on the structural driv ers of overhead costs (such as the organization' s scale and
scope, the level and type of technology, and product variety strategy), but also on

executional cost driv ers that hinge on the organization' s ability to " execute" its
operations efficiently and effectively (Porter, 1985; Riley, 1987; Shank and
Gov indarajan, 1994; Shields and Young, 1995). Key executional cost drivers in this
literature include practices such as work force involvement, customer and supplier
relations, the extent of total quality management activ ities, plant layout, and product and
process design.
The balanced scorecard concept moves beyond the analysis of cost drivers to
emphasize the measurement of performance along multiple dimensions of "value
drivers," including financial performance, customer relations, internal business processes,
and learning and innovation, that are linked in a causal "business model" of leading and
lagging performance drivers and outcomes (Kaplan and N orton, 1996). Kaplan and
N orton (1996) contend that an integrated balanced scorecard allows managers to better
understand the relations among v arious strategic objectives, to communicate the
association between employees ' actions and the chosen strategic goals, and to allocate
resources and set priorities based on the initiatives ' contributions to long-term strategic
objectives.

Studies within these research streams typically examine claims that non-financial
measures are " leading" indicators or drivers of future financial performance. M any of
these studies investigate the relation between customer satisfaction measures and
subsequent accounting or stock returns, with mixed results. Banker et al. (2000) and
Behn and Riley ( 1999) find positive associations between customer satisfaction measures
and future accounting performance in the hotel and airline industries, respectively. Ittner
and Larcker's ( 1998b) investigation of customer, business unit, and firm-level data also
supports claims that customer satisfaction measures are leading indicators of customer
purchase behavior, accounting performance, and current market value. However, the
relation between customer satisfaction and future performance is non-linear, with little
performance effect at high satisfaction levels. In addition, their firm-level results vary by
industry, with positive relations in some industries and negative or insignificant relations
in others. Foster and Gupta's (1997) study of customer data from a wholesale beverage
distributor also finds positive, negative, or insignificant results depending upon the
questions included in the satisfaction measures or the model specification (levels or
percentage changes).
Surprisingly little research has been conducted on the balanced scorecard concept,
despite considerable interest in the topic. What evidence that exists prov ides limited
support for the scorecard's claimed benefits. A survey of Australian manufacturers by
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998) indicates that the average plant rated the benefits
from "balanced performance measures" 3.81 on a scale ranging from 1 (no benefit) to 7
(high benefit), with higher and lower performing plants reporting no consistent
differences in the perceived benefits from balanced performance measures. The modest

perceived benefits from balanced performance measures are supported by Ittner et al.
(2001), who find that the implementation of a balanced scorecard compensation plan in a
retail bank brought no significant change in branch managers' understanding of strategic
goals or their connection to the managers' actions, and was associated with lower
perceived adequacy of information on managers' progress towards business goals.

4.2.3 Limitations and Research Opportunities Related to ABC and Cost Drivers
Overal~

the cost driver analyses provide evidence that factors other than volume have

a statistically significant relation with overhead, and tend to verify at least some of the
key assumptions of ABC. However, this work has a number oflimitations. Many ofthe
studies use direct labor costs as a proxy for production volume. Although consistent with
the overhead allocation base used in many traditional cost accounting systems, including
direct labor as an independent variable causes the effects of non-volume cost drivers to be
understated if these drivers also impact direct labor requirements. Ittner and MacDuffie
(1995) find that cost drivers such as product variety and automation affect manufacturing
overhead not only directly, but also indirectly through increased direct labor requirements
and the resulting need for higher supetvisory and administrative staffmg. Similarly,
Dopuch and Gupta (1994) and Fisher and Ittner (1999) find significant associations
between direct labor costs and non-volume cost drivers such as the number of production
batches and product mix variability, even after controlling for production volumes. If
researchers are to develop a deeper understanding of v alue drivers, both the direct and
indirect effects of these drivers must be taken into account.
Cost driver studies also contain little discussion of the contingency factors
influencing the relative importance of different value drivers. Although an examination of

individual cost driver studies in different industries suggests that factors such as
technology, production process (e.g., batch to mass production), and scheduling practices
affect the importance of various cost drivers, no study has explicitly investigated how
these and other contingent factors moderate cost driver effects.
Most prior studies also ignore executional cost drivers such as product
manufacturability and work practices, even though these drivers may be harder to
replicate and potentially more valuable for achieving competitive advantage (Porter,
1985; Riley, 1987; Shank and Govindarajan, 1994). Ittner and MacDuffie (1995) find that
differences in work systems (e.g., worker involvement, use of teams, and job rotation)
rather than differences in structural cost drivers (e.g., product variety) explain much of
the overhead labor advantage found in Japanese automobile assembly plants relative to
their western competitors. These results suggest that greater understanding ofthe
methods available to control costs will require researchers to examine both executional
and structural cost drivers.
One promising avenue for future research is exploring the influence of structural and
executional cost drivers on the entire value chain. The strategic cost management
literature argues that cost driver analyses should not be limited to the activities carried out
within the firm, but should also incorporate linkages with suppliers and customers.
Analyzing cost drivers throughout the value chain is essential for determining where in
the value chain-from design to distribution-costs can be lowered or customer value
enhanced (Hergert and Morris, 1989; Shank and Govindarajan, 1994).
It will also be important to understand the interactions and tradeoffs among the

various structural and executional cost drivers. With the exception ofDatar et al. (1993),

prior studies treat the v arious cost drivers as independent. However, cost drivers
frequently counteract or reinforce each other (Porter, 1985, p. 84). The presence of
counteracting and reinforcing cost driv ers implies the need to optimize entire processes to
generate lasting improv ements in cost position relative to competitors. Future research
can attempt to identify and resolve these tradeoffs in different settings.
M ost importantly, studies need to determine whether improv ed understanding of cost
drivers leads managers to make better decisions or improves organizational performance
(Dopuch, 1993). Research on ABC success relies almost exclusively on perceptual
outcome measures, such as the extent of ABC system usage or the perceived benefits
from adoption. 15 In general, these studies report moderate satisfaction with ABC. While
perceptual measures such as these are useful for evaluating ABC implementation success,
they provide no evidence that ABC adopters achieve higher operational or financial
performance than non-adopters. Indeed, other studies suggest that many ABC adopters
have abandoned their systems 16, raising questions about the performance consequences of
ABC implementation and use.

4.2.4 Limitations and Research Opportunities Related to Non-F inancial Value Drivers
Studies examining the value relevance of non-financial performance measures are
plagued by many of the same limitations as the cost driver studies. In particular, the
studies examine only one of many potential non-financial value drivers, and ignore
interactions with other potential value drivers. These limitations can result in misleading
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See, for example, Shields, 1995; Swenson, 1995; Foster and Sw enson, 1997; McGowan and Klammer,
1997; McGowan, 1998; and Anderson and Young , 1999.
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Ness and Cucuzza (1 995), for example, estimate that only 10% of firms that adopt ABC continue to use
it. Gosselin (1997) finds that 36.4% of Canadian business units that adopted ABC later dropped the
systems, while Innes and Mitchell ( 199 1) find that 60% of ABC adopters in the U.K. stopped using the
systems.

inferences if non-financial measures are highly correlated (i.e., correlated omitted
variable bias), or if different non-fmancial value drivers are complements or substitutes.
To provide some ev idence on these issues, we asked senior executives from the 148
fmancial service firms discussed earlier to rate the extent to which various performance
categories are important drivers of their firms' long-term organizational success. Their
responses are shown in Figure 4. Despite the emphasis on financial measures in
accounting research, short-term financial performance ranks only fifth most important,
behind customer relations, operational performance, product and service quality, and
employee relations. Innovation and community relations also receive relatively high
importance scores .

*** Figure 4 about here ***

The scores given to the non-financial performance categories are highly correlated.
Seventy-two percent of correlations among the non-financial categories (not reported in
the tables) are significant at the one percent level (two-tailed). For example, customer
relations (the highest rated value driver) has a correlation of0.40 or greater with
operational performance, quality, employee relations, innovation, and community
relations, suggesting that these performance categories may be complementary. None of
the correlations is significantly negativ e, providing no evidence that the categories are
perceived to be substitutes. The significant relations among performance categories
suggest that efforts to understand the value relevance of non-financial performance

measures require researchers to examine a broader set of potential drivers and their
interactions.
N on-financial value driver studies also ignore contingent factors, even though it is
likely that issues such as strategy, competitiv e environment, and customer requirements
moderate the relation between these drivers and economic performance, and may explain
the mixed results in prior studies. The survey data in Table 2, for example, document
significant associations between perceived value drivers and organizational strategy. The
table provides correlations between the financial service firms' strategy constructs
(described in Table 1) and perceived value drivers (described in Figure 4). Customerrelated performance is perceived to be more important to long-term success when the
firm follows an innovative strategy (INNOV), but is not associated with flexibility
(FLEX) or the pursuit of existing customers or markets (PREDICT). When the firm
pursues existing customers and operates in relatively predictable markets (PREDICT),
community relations are believed to be more important. Flexibility and innovation, in
turn, are both associated with higher importance scores for employee relations, quality,
alliances, supplier relations, and innovation. Ignoring contingent factors such as these
leaves our understanding of value driv ers rudimentary.

*** Table 2 about here ***

An interesting question is the effect information technologies will have on the
identification and importance of value drivers. Many enterprise resource planning (ERP)
systems now contain "data mining" capabilities that allow companies to more easily

identify statistical relations among performance measures. Integrated systems and the
internet are also making data interchange easier, potentially reducing the costs associated
with traditional cost drivers such as order taking and engineering changes. Anderson and
Lanen (2000), for example, find that electronic data interchange with suppliers can
mitigate some of the costs of complexity identified in earlier cost driver studies. Studies
can extend their analysis to other forms of information technology and other managerial
accounting topics.
The use of"business models" that link multiple value drivers in a causal chain of
leading and lagging performance indicators offers another research opportunity. Both the
balanced scorecard and VBM literatures maintain that companies must develop explicit
business models in order to identify which drivers have the biggest impact on value and
to communicate how the organization' s objectives and strategies are to be achieved (e.g.,
Copeland et al., 1996; Kaplan and N orton, 1996).
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Yet little is know about how (or if)

companies develop explicit business models or how these models vary depending upon
the organization' s strategies, objectives, and organizational design.
Finally, the performance effects of the balanced scorecard and other value driv er
techniques remain open issues. Despite widespread adoption of these practices, we still
have little hard evidence that company performance improves with their use. Additional
research on the performance effects ofthese practices can make a significant contribution
to the managerial accounting literature.
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4.4 Developing Action Plans, Selecting Measures, and Setting Targets
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See Rucci et al. (1998) for an example of the causal business model developed by Sears, Roebuck and
Company .
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It is likely that these practices are not equally beneficial in all settings, requiring researchers to examine
the contingency factors that influence the performance effects (if any) from these techniques. See Gosselin

Most economic and contingency theories in managerial accounting emphasize both
the decision-making process and the development of performance measures and
compensation plans that encourage employees to take the actions desired by the owners
of the frrm. Similarly, the fourth step in the value-based management framework is
developing action plans based on the value driver analysis and selecting the measures and
targets that will be used to monitor their success. This section examines these issues by
reviewing research on (1) the selection of investments and action plans, (2) the choice of
performance measures, and (3) the setting of performance targets.

4.4.1

Selection ofAction Plans

The choice of specific action plans has received virtually no attention in the
managerial accounting literature, with one exception-the selection of capital
investments. The majority of empirical studies in this area examine whether firms using
sophisticated capital budgeting techniques such as discounted cash flow and internal rate
of return perform better than firms using simpler methods such as payback period or
accounting rate of return. Studies by Klammer (1973) and Haka et al. (1985) find no
evidence that more sophisticated capital budgeting techniques improve performance.
Haka ( 1987) extends these studies by testing a contingency theory of discounted cash
flow (DCF) effectiveness. She finds that shareholder returns are higher when DCF
techniques are used in predictable environments and are accompanied by the use of longterm reward systems and decentralized capital budgeting processes. Other factors such as
frrm strategy and environmental diversity have no significant impact on DCF
effectiveness.

(1997) and Krumwiede ( 1998) for studies examining some of the contextual factors associated with the
adoption, implementation, and abandonment of activity-based costing systems.

One criticism of these studies is their exclusive focus on quantitative, financial
analyses, ignoring the many other types of information used in capital investment
decisions. In contrast, Larcker ( 1981) examines the perceived importance of internal to
external and financial to non-financial information in strategic capital budgeting, and
their relation to decentralization, vertical integration, internal technology, and
organizational size, as well as environmental dynamism, hostility, and heterogeneity. His
results depend upon the stage of the decision process, with internal and external data
equally important in problem identification and alternative development, and internal
data more important in selection. Financial and non-financial information are equally
important for all phases, but none of the contingency variables is statistically significant.
Although these results suggest that non-financial and external information are important
in capital budgeting, Larcker (1981) does not examine whether the performance effects of
capital investments vary w ith the types of information used in the decision process.
Carr and Tomkin's (1996) analysis of 51 strategic investment decisions in the
automobile components industry examines the value-based management framework's
hypothesis that the effective choice of actions plans depends upon the sources of
competitive advantage and the fmn ' s value drivers. They find that "successful"
companies place five times more attention on competitive issues, almost three times as
much on value chain considerations such as customer relations, and twice as much on
fundamental cost drivers as their less successful competitors, while devoting only a
quarter as much attention to financial computations. Although intriguing, these results
are limited by the authors' use of subjective v ariable coding and subjectiv e performance
evaluations, and by the lack of statistical tests.

4.4.2 Choice ofPerformance Measures
Considerably more attention has been paid to the choice of performance measures .
Although the VBM framework suggests that performance measure choices should be
driven in part by the results of value driver analyses, most empirical studies go directly
from the firm' s organizational design, strategy, or technology choices to the choice of
measurement systems. In general, these studies can be divided into two groups: (1) those
examining a v ariety of information and control system attributes, and (2) those focused
specifically on compensation criteria.

Broad Control System Studies. Several studies in the first group investigate the
association between organizational design issues and performance measures. Hayes
(1977) finds that performance measures of highly interdependent subunits are most useful
when they include measures to assess managers ' reliability, cooperation, and flexibility.
Scott and Tiessen (1999) report a positive relation between the proportion of time spent
in teams and the diversity of performance measures (both financial and non-financial)
used in manufacturing plants. Scapen and Sales (1985), on the other hand, find no
association between divisional autonomy and interdependencies and the financial criteria
used to evaluate managerial performance, investment appraisal criteria (rmancial versus
non-financial), or control over authorized capital projects.
Chenhall and Morris (1986) examine the perceived usefulness of four management
accounting system attributes: scope (e.g., external, non-fmancial, and future-oriented),
timeliness, integration, and lev el of aggregation. Decentralization is associated with a
preference for aggregated and integrated information, perceived environmental
uncertainty with broad scope and timely information, and organizational

interdependencies with broad scope, aggregated, and integrated information. M oreover,
the effects ofPEU and organizational interdependencies are due in part to indirect
associations through decentralization. Gul and Chia ( 1994), in turn, test a three-way
interaction between PEU, decentralization, and managerial accounting system scope and
aggregation. They find decentralization and the availability of broad scope and
aggregated data associated with higher perceived managerial performance under
conditions of high PEU, but with lower performance under conditions of low PEU . Other
studies finding significant relations between environmental uncertainty and information
system design include Gordon and N arayanan (1983) and Chong (1996).
Consistent with most managerial accounting theories, strategy is also an important
determinant of performance measurement and control systems. Simons ( 1987) finds that
successful prospectors use a high degree of forecast data in control reports, set tight
budget goals, and monitor outputs carefully, with little attention paid to cost control.
Large prospectors emphasize frequent reporting and use uniform control systems that are
modified frequently, while defenders use management control systems less actively.
Guilding (1999) adds evidence that prospector firms and firms following a build strategy
make greater use of competitor assessment systems and perceive these systems to be
more useful than do defender firms or those following a harvest strategy.
Studies examining the association between manufacturing strategies and performance
measurement systems have also found systematic links among these choices. In general,
organizations following advanced manufacturing strategies such as just-in-time
production, total quality management, and flexible manufacturing are positively
associated with the prov ision of non-financial measures and goals such as defect rates,

on-time delivery, and machine utilization, as well as greater emphasis on non-financial
measures in reward systems (e.g., Daniel and Reitsperger 1991; Banker et al., 1993; Ittner
and Larcker, 1995; Perera et al., 1997). However, empirical support for the hypothesized
performance benefits from these measurement practices is mixed. Abernethy and Lillis
(1995) find higher perceived performance in "non-flexible" manufacturers when greater
emphasis is placed on efficiency-based measures, but no significant correlation between
the use of efficiency measures and the performance of "flexible" firms. Sim and Killough
(1998) find benefits from the provision of performance goals and performance-contingent
incentive plans in TQM and JIT plants, but not from the provision of quality and
customer-related performance measures. Perera et al. ( 1997) also find no relation
between the use of non-financial measures and perceived manufacturing performance.
Ittner and Larcker ( 1995), in turn, report positive effects from the prov ision of problemsolving information and the use of non-financial reward criteria in organizations making
little use of TQM practices, but no statistical association in organizations with extensive
TQM programs. They conjecture that other TQM practices may substitute for these
information and control mechanisms.
Finally, the first group of studies suggests that production technology plays a role in
the use and benefits of budgetary control systems. Merchant' s ( 1984) research indicates
that process automation is positiv ely correlated with requirements for managers to
explain variances and to their reactions to budget overruns. Dunk ( 1992) adds evidence
that production subunit performance is high (low ) when the use of budgetary controls and
manufacturing automation are both high (low). Brownell and M erchant (1990) examine
the influence of product standardization (e.g., one-of-a-kind vs. commodity) on the

petformance effects of budget system design and use. Where product standardization is
low, high budgetary participation and the use of budgets as static targets are more
effective in promoting departmental petformance. The type of process (job shop to
continuous flow) has little effect on the utility of budget systems.
Overall, this set of studies generally supports theories that the choice of petformance
measures is a function of the organization's competitive environment, strategy, and
organizational design, but the performance effects of these choices remains uncertain.

Compensation Studies. The second group of performance measure studies looks
specifically at compensation plans. These studies examine many of the same factors as
the first group of papers. Bushman et al. (1996) and Ittner et al. (1997) investigate the
determinants of petformance measure choices in CEO bonus contracts. Significant
factors explaining the weights placed on individual and non-financial petformance
measures include the extent to which the firm follows a prospector strategy, the firm ' s
growth opportunities (proxied by its market-to-book ratio), the adoption of strategic
quality initiatives, the length of product development and product life cycles, industry
regulation, and "noise" in traditional financial measures.
Executive compensation studies suggest that many of these same factors are also
associated with the relative weight placed on accounting and market (e.g., stock price or
stock return) measures. 19 Ely (1991) finds that the choice between alternative accounting
measures varies by industry, suggesting that these measures must be tailored to reflect
industry-specific value drivers and competitive environments. Lambert and Larcker
(1987) and Sloan (1993) demonstrate that the weight placed on market measures relative

to accounting measures increases when accounting measures are noisier proxies of
managerial effort, the ftrm has a higher growth rate, and managers hold less of the firm 's
equity. In a similar vein, Lewellen et al. (1987) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) ftnd that
stock-related compensation is higher when managers' time horizons need to be
lengthened, while Bizjak et al. ( 1993) ftnd that high growth firms place greater weight on
long-term components of compensation (option and stock holdings) than short-term
components (salary and annual bonus). Clinch (1991) also ftnds that the weight on stock
returns relative to return on equity increases with large ftrms' growth rates. Surprisingly,
the weight on stock returns is lower in smaller f"rrms with high growth rates. Clinch
(1991) ftnds similar results when stock returns are replaced with expenditures on research
and development.
While the prior studies examine the types of performance measures used for
compensation, other studies examine the organizational level at which performance
criteria are measured. Bushman et al. (1995) investigate the factors affecting the use of
business unit versus corporate-level performance measures in business unit compensation
plans. They f"md the use of corporate measures positively associated with organizational
interdependencies. A similar study by Keating ( 1997) examines the use of division and
ftrm-level measures for division manager performance evaluation. Signilicant factors in
the choice of measures are divisional growth opportunities, organizational
interdependencies, and the division' s size relativ e to the size ofthe company.
Ittner and Larcker (2001) extend these studies to incentive plans for non-management
workers. They find that informativeness issues such as those addressed in economic
19
Although a full review of the executive compensation literature is outside the scope of this paper,
comprehensive reviews on this topic can be found in Pavlik et al. (1 993), Murphy (1998), and Bushman

theories are key factors in the selection of performance measures for worker incentive
plans. Howev er, they also find that other reasons for adopting the plan (e.g., improving
pay-for-performance linkages and upgrading the workforce) play a role in worker-level
performance measure choices, as do union representation and management participation
in plan design. Moreover, the factors influencing the use of specific measures (e.g.,
accounting, cost control, quality, safety, etc.) vary, suggesting that the aggregate
performance measure classifications commonly used in compensation research, such as
the comparison of financial versus non-financial metrics, provide somewhat misleading
inferences regarding performance measurement choices.
Although none of the straight compensation studies examines performance
consequences, related research suggests that organizations that align their incentive
plans' performance measures with contingency factors such as those discussed above
achieve higher performance. Simons ( 1987) and Govindarajan (1988) both find higher
performance in organizations following defender or low cost strategies when bonuses are
awarded for the achievement of budget targets. Similarly, Govindarajan and Gupta
(1985) find that greater reliance on non-financial compensation criteria (sales growth,
market share, new product and market development, and political/public affairs) has a
stronger positive impact in units following a build strategy than in those following a
harvest strategy.
More important from a value-based management perspective, evidence on the
benefits from tying compensation to EVA is mixed. As discussed earlier, studies by
Wallace (1997) and Hogan and Lewis ( 1999) reach conflicting conclusions regarding the
performance of firms adopting residual income-based compensation plans (such as EVA)

and Smith (this issue).

relative to the performance of control samples. In contrast, Wallace's (1998) survey of
EVA users finds that firms using this measure for compensation purposes report greater
awareness of the cost of capital, reduced average accounts receivable age, increased sales
revenues, and a longer accounts receivable age than EVA users who do not use the
measure for compensation. Given these mixed results, the benefits ofEV A-based
compensation plans remain an open issue.

4.4.3 Target Setting
Prior empirical studies typically ignore one of the key aspects of performance
measurement-target setting. Targets play an important role in selecting action plans and
investments and evaluating performance. However, in contrast to the large body of
behavioral accounting research on target setting, almost no empirical research has been
conducted on this topic. What little research that exists focuses on the development of
targets for compensation purposes. Merchant and Manzoni ( 1989) provide evidence on
the achievability of performance targets in bonus plans. Their case study research
indicates that business unit managers reached their targets eighty to ninety percent of the
time, a result that is inconsistent with prescriptions in the managerial accounting
literature suggesting that budget targets should be achievable less than fifty percent of the
time to provide optimum motivation. Interviews with these managers indicates that
highly achievable targets are desirable because they improve corporate reporting,
resource planning, and control, and can still be highly motivating in combination with
other control system elements.
Murphy ( 1999) investigates the use of internal standards (budgets, prior year
performance, and discretionary) versus external standards (peer group, timeless

standards, and cost of capital) in executive incentive plans. He finds that companies are
more likely to choose external standards (which are less easily affected by management
actions) when prior-year performance is a noisy estimate of contemporaneous
performance. Moreover, companies using budget and other internally determined
performance standards have less variable bonus payments and are more likely to smooth
earnings than those using externally determined standards.
Indjejikian et al. (2000) fmd that managers' earned bonuses exceed target bonuses on
average, and that target bonuses are adjusted upward (downward) in response to
performance above (below) the standard in a prior year (known as the "ratchet effect").
In addition, the magnitude of the difference between earned and target bonus is related to
proxies for information asymmetries between managers and their superiors.
Unfortunately, none of these studies examines the performance consequences associated
differences in target setting practices.

4.4.4 Limitations
The preceding studies generally support theories that the choice of action plans
and performance measures is contingent on organizational characteristics. However, the
studies have several shortcomings. First, each examines only one or a few uses of
performance measures (e.g., compensation or capital justification) and ignores other
potential uses (e.g., planning and problem identification) that may be equally or more
important to frrm success. Second, the studies do not investigate the consistency in
performance measures used for different purposes or the alignment between the measures
and the firm's specific value drivers, despite claims that performance is enhanced when
measurement systems are aligned with critical success factors (Dixon et al., 1990; Lingle

and Schiemann, 19%). Third, the studies overlook the quality of information used for
decision-making and control (e.g., accessibility, timeliness, and reliability), even though
information system characteristics are likely to influence decision-making quality and the
incentive effects of control systems.
We illustrate some of the issues raised by these omissions using survey data from
the 148 financial service firms. Figure 5 provides information on the consistency
between ( 1) the perceived importance of individual value drivers, (2) the performance
measures used for identifying problems and developing actions plans, evaluating capital
investments, and evaluating managerial performance, and (3) the development of formal
goals for each performance category. We define a "measurement gap" as the diffe rence
between the perceived importance of each performance category and the extent to which
(1) the performance category is used for internal purposes, and (2) formal strategic goals
are established for the category. A firm is assumed to have zero "gap" if the score for
internal usage or goal setting is greater than or equal to the perceived importance score.

*** Figure 5 about here ***

With the exception of financial and operational performance, substantial gaps
exist for all ofthe higher ranked performance categories. The gaps vary across uses,
indicating that extensive use of performance measures for one purpose does not
necessarily imply that the measures are used for other purposes. The largest gaps relate
to the use of customer, employee, and community measures for evaluating capital
investments. Gaps for identifying problems and developing action plans generally are

smaller than those associated with other uses. These responses raise a number of points
that have been ov erlooked in prior studies. For example, do the same contingency factors
influence the performance measures chosen for different purposes? Does consistency in
the measures used for various purposes improve performance? Are some performance
measure choices (e.g., performance evaluation and compensation) more important than
others? Are greater "measurement gaps" associated with lower organizational
performance? Attempts to address these questions not only require researchers to
understand the value drivers within an organization, but also require studies to examine a
much broader set of measurement choices than has been done in the past.
Figure 6 compares the mean importance scores for each performance category to
the respondents' rating of measurement quality for each category (where 1 = extremely
poor quality of measurement and 6 = high quality of measurement). With the exception
of short-term financial performance, measurement quality ranks lower than importance
for each performance category. Particularly large differences exist for some of the most
important value driver categories, suggesting that studies inv estigating the internal use
and benefits of these performance measures are incomplete without considering how well
this information is measured.

*** Figure 6 about here ***

Most prior studies hav e also assumed that the goal of performance evaluation and
compensation systems is motivating employees to act in the manner desired by the
owners of the firm. Although consistent with agency models, this assumption ignores

other potential implementation goals such as attracting and retaining employees, shifting
compensation risk from the ftrm to employees, and developing careers. As shown in
Table 3, these goals can play a significant role in the design of performance evaluation
and compensation systems. The table lists the relative importance placed on various
objectives when conducting performance appraisals, designing non-management
incentive plans, and dev eloping stock option plans.
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The data in Panel A of Table 3, for

example, indicate that most companies use performance appraisals for career
development as well as for compensation. In fact, 61.4 percent of the respondents stated
that the use of performance evaluations for career development is of equal or more
importance than the evaluations ' use in determining compensation.

*** Table 3 about here* **

Panel B reports the importance companies place on various reasons for introducing
non-management incentive plans. Although most plans are designed to improve business
performance and profitability, the methods for achieving these objectives vary. The
implementation reason receiving the largest number of "high importance" ratings is
fostering teamwork, followed by better pay-performance linkage and enhancing
communication of business objectives. In contrast, providing a method to allocate
available award funds to high performing individuals and teams is among the least
important reasons for implementing the plan.
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Survey data on performance appraisals were provided by the consulting fmn Watson Wyatt. Data on
non-management incentive plans were provided by the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies
Research. Th consulting firm iQuantic provided data on stock option plans in high technology companies.

Panel C provides information on the reasons for adopting ongoing stock option plans
in high technology firms. The most important factor by far is retaining existing
employees. Providing competitive total compensation and attracting new employees also
rank relatively high. Rewarding past performance, encouraging stock ownership, and
rewarding specific project milestones or goals, on the other hand, rank among the lowest
objectives. Taken together, the survey evidence in Table 3 indicates that employee
motivation is only one of many reasons for implementing performance evaluation and
reward systems. As Prendergast's (1999) agency model shows, these multiple objectives
have major implications for the design and performance consequences of performance
measurement and compensation plans- implications that should be factored into future
empirical studies.
In addition to the problems noted above, the studies reviewed in this section
highlight some ofthe limitations associated with the data sources commonly used in
managerial accounting research. These limitations are found throughout empirical
managerial accounting studies, but are most evident in this set of papers due to the larger
volume of published research on these topics. The majority of studies rely on one of
three sources for their samples: (1) publicly available information, (2) surveys conducted
by third parties (e.g. , consulting companies), and (3) surveys conducted by the
researchers. Studies focused on the choice of performance measures in incentiv e plans,
for example, typically use public disclosures on top executive compensation (which are
legally required in proxy statements) or data collected by consulting firms. Both of these
sources have limitations. By relying on proxy disclosures, compensation studies tend to
place little emphasis on the methods used to reward lower-level employees, even though

these compensation practices may have a greater influence on ftrm performance than
executive reward practices.
Another common problem with the use of public data sources is relatively weak
independent or predictor v ariables. In many cases, proxies for the hypothesized
predictors are only remotely related to the constructs of interest. For example, market-tobook ratios have served as proxies for growth opportunities, strategy, intangible assets,
and information asymmetries, ev en though it is unclear exactly what this measure is
capturing. Studies can also be forced to use measures that are not at the same unit of
analysis as the hypothesized associations. Bushman et al. (1995), for example, use
fmancial statement disclosures on the firm's geographical and product diversification to
test models on business unit performance measurement practices. Similarly, Keating
(1997) uses industry -level proxies for some of the hypothesized divisional performance
measure determinants because these issues were not addressed in his original survey.
Survey data collected by third parties such as consulting firms are also subject to
potential limitations. In most cases, there is no indication of the sample selection biases
associated with these surveys. Studies rarely report the extent to which the survey
responses are limited to clients of the consulting company conducting the survey, the
overall response rate, or the biases in the types of responding organizations. Studies
using third party data are also limited by the questions asked in the survey (which
frequently have poor psychometric properties and are not be directly related to the
variables of interest) and the lack of desired control variables (e.g., other organizational
practices that may affect control system design or performance). Moreover, multiple
indicators for each desired construct and multiple respondents for each question are often

unavailable, making it difficult to determine the resulting constructs' reliability and
validity.
Surveys conducted by researchers are not immune to these problems. Young's
(1996) critique of survey research in managerial accounting discusses a variety of
methodological problems that are common in all survey research (e.g., response biases
and construct reliability and validity). In addition, our review identified a number of
limitations specific to managerial accounting studies. First, the surveys are often very
narrow and ask few, if any, questions about organizational practices other than those
being studied. But managerial accounting practices are rarely implemented in isolation
from other organizational changes. As a result, correlated omitted variable problems are
likely.
The survey questions often lack specificity. For example, many performance
measurement studies simply ask respondents the extent to which their firm uses a specific
measure, without specifying the decision context (e.g., compensation, capital
justification, or operational reviews). This makes it difficult to determine whether the
responses are consistent (e.g., one manager may answer with respect to compensation,
another with respect to manufacturing performance reports) or to interpret the results.
Far too many surveys rely on respondents' perceptions oftheir firms ' use of
managerial accounting or other organizational practices, rather than asking for "harder"
responses such as the percentage of employees actually using a given technique, the
weight placed on various performance measures when computing bonuses, or the number
of allocation bases used in the cost accounting system. This problem is compounded
when the study also uses perceptions of organizational performance or success (e.g.,

asking respondents to rate their performance relative to competitors or relative to their
own expectations). Regressing perceived performance on perceived accounting system
uses or benefits is likely to yield highly biased results.
A final limitation in this set of papers is measuring the "match" or ''fit" between a
managerial accounting practice and the firm 's organizational environment when
assessing performance consequences. The frameworks discussed in Section 2 contend
that accounting and control practices must be aligned with the organization' s
environment. However, managerial accounting theories and frameworks provide little
guidance on the correct method to measure the ''fit" between managerial accounting
practices and other organizational characteristics. As a result, a variety of empirical
methods have been used to measure these concepts, all of which have strengths and
weaknesses. Perhaps the simplest technique is to estimate moderated regression models
that include multiple interactions among the independent variables. However, this
approach assumes a very specific functional form for the interactions, and is typically
plagued by high levels of multicollinearity, making interpretation difficult. 21
Cluster analysis has also been used to assess the complete "package" of
accounting and control practices (e.g., Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Ittner et al.,
1999). Cluster analysis groups observations that are in close proximity in multidimensional space for a given set of variables. By incorporating multiple managerial
accounting practices, the resulting clusters identify different "configurations" of overall
accounting and control system design, which can then be related to organizational
performance. Researchers using this approach argue that cluster analysis provides a
"systems approach" for evaluating managerial accounting practices. However, the

selection of the " correct" number of clusters is more art than science, and the resulting
clusters are often difficult to intetpret. Moreover, it is impossible to determine which of
the multiple attributes and interactions captured in the clusters actually drive any
observed performance differences.
Other researchers measure system "misfit" as the deviation from some " optimal"
system design. This approach requires the researcher to predict the "optimal" practices
for the organization using some method such as regression analysis, and then use the
residuals for each observation to estimate the distance the organization is from the
estimated " optimal" practice. An alternative approach is to measure the deviation in a set
of practices from the practices used by the highest performing organization, with the level
of "misfit" operationalized using a summary measure such as Euclidean distance (e.g.,
Selto et al., 1995). The primary drawback ofthese approaches is the need to determine
appropriate benchmark models for the choice of accounting and control practices (i.e.,
correct functional form for the prediction models, selection of appropriate contingency
variables, and the accuracy of the assumption that observed practices, on average, are
"optimal"). Further theoretical and methodological advances are needed to determine
which of the many approaches for measuring ''fit" is most appropriate.

4.4.5 Research Opportunities
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed above, our limited understanding of the
identification and justification of improvement opportunities, action plans, and
investments raises a number of opportunities for research on the choice and performance
consequences of these practices. One interesting topic is the role and benefits of "real
option" techniques for investment justification. Dissatisfaction with discounted cash flow
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See Hartmann and Moers (1999) for a critique of moderated regression analysis in budgetary research.

techniques has led to a growing literature focusing on the value of managerial flexibility
in handling real asset investments, or "real options." Trigeorgis and Kasanen (1991), for
instance, propose an options-based investment planning model that quantifies v arious
strategic components of value, such as the flexibility embedded in real options, the
synergy between groups of project taken simultaneously, and interdependencies among
projects over time. Although Busby and Pitts (1997) find that decision-makers intuitively
include real options thinking in some of their inv estment decisions, few firms have
formal procedures for assessing these options. As more firms begin quantifying the v alue
of real options, research can examine the valuation methods used and the applicability of
the real option concept in different contexts.
The growing use of multiple financial and non-financial performance measures
for decision-making and compensation purposes leads to questions about how measures
defined in different dimensions (e.g., money, time, satisfaction survey scores, defect
rates, etc.) should be combined to form an overall assessment. One possibility is to allow
the decision-maker to subjectively decide the weights. However, subjective assessments
are prone to a number of potential biases (Prendegast and Topel, 1993). An alternativ e is
to combine the measures using a pre-determined weighting formula. Difficulties with
this option include determining the weights to place on the indiv idual measures, and
preventing the game-playing associated w ith any explicit, formula-based rules (Kaplan
and Norton, 1996). The growing emphasis on multiple measures for decision-making
and compensation purposes makes the relative value of subjectiv e v ersus formulaic
evaluations an interesting research topic.

The benefits from including economic value measures in compensation plans is
also an important issue. Although most value-based management advocates endorse the
use of these measures at higher organizational levels, there is considerable debate as to
their efficacy at lower levels. Stewart (1995), for example, asserts that the poor results
from many EV A implementations are attributable to the fact that EVA use is not
pervasive throughout the organization, especially for compensation decisions. Copeland
et al. (1996), on the other hand, claim that lower-level managers should be evaluated and
rewarded based on the specific financial and operational value drivers that are most
closely tied to the managers ' actions. Garvey and Milbourne (2000) argue that EV Abased compensation may be more beneficial when a company's EVA measures are more
highly correlated with stock returns. Kaplan and N orton (1996), in turn, are unclear as to
how the value drivers in the balanced scorecard should be used in compensation.
Surveys suggest that VBM adopters are following a variety of compensation approaches
(Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; KPMG Consulting, 1999), providing a natural opportunity to
study the relative value of economic profit measures at various organizational levels and
in different settings.
A final topic is the setting of performance targets. 22 As noted above, this is a
critical but under-researched area of managerial accounting. This topic is especially
important given the rising use of non-financial measures, many of which are likely to be
characterized by diminishing or negative returns at higher performance levels (e.g., Ittner
and Larcker, 1998b ). A survey of customer satisfaction measurement by Arthur
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A related issue is the use and performance benefits of target costing practices in product development.
Target costing is a method for designing products and services to simultaneously meet customer needs and
achieve the company 's profit targets. Despite considerable discussion of the benefits from target costing,
Koga (1998a, 1998b) finds only mixed evidence that the use of target costing practices by Japanese camera

Anderson & Co. (1994), for example, finds that one of the most difficult problems in
setting satisfaction goals is determining where these diminishing returns occur.
Researchers can make a significant contribution by providing ev idence on the methods
used to set financial and non-financial targets and the performance implications arising
from these choices. Among the interesting research topics are the methods used to
develop targets, the target's level oftightness, and the use and consistency of
performance targets for different purposes (e.g., compensation, capital investments,
identification of improv ement opportunities, and planning). Figure 6, for example, shows
wide differences in the extent to which financial service firms establish formal goals for
different performance categories, with particularly big differences between financial and
non-financial measures.
The methods used to establish goals for different types of measures can also vary.
Table 4 illustrates this v ariety using survey data on non-management incentive plans .
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The responses indicate that more than one method is often used to establish goals for a
given type of measure, with the primary goal setting method varying by measure. In
some cases, no targets are established; 11.4 percent of the respondents to this survey set
no goal for financial performance and 30.3 percent set no goal for attendance. The wide
variety of practices provides an excellent opportunity to increase our understanding of
target setting methods and consequences.

*** Table 4 about here ***

manufacturers is associated with lower product development engineering hours and subsequent product
manufacturing costs.
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Access to the confidential data on non-management incentive plans reported in Table 4 was provided by
the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies Research.

4.5 Evaluating Performance and Reassessing Organizational Objectives and Plans
The final two steps in the VBM framework involve the evaluation of performance
and the reassessment of organizational objectives, plans, and strategies when results do
not meet expectations. The few related accounting studies on these issues indicate that
the benefits from formal review and reconciliation procedures vary depending on a
variety of contextual factors.
Smith's ( 1993) examination of investment monitoring systems, for example, fmds
that firms that employ these systems exhibit a positive relation between investment
abandonments and performance, while firms without these systems exhibit a negative
relation. Myers et al. (1991) also fmd that the initiation of sophisticated post-auditing
procedures by firms using sophisticated capital justification techniques has significant,
positive effects on frrm performance. However, Gordon and Smith (1992) find that
performance is contingent on an appropriate "match" between post-audit sophistication
and firm-specific variables such as the level of asymmetric information, capital intensity,
capital expenditures, and insider ownership.
Strategic control system studies indicate that the advantages of formal processes for
determining whether a strategy is being implemented as planned and assessing whether
the strategic results are those intended can actually be counter-productive in some
environments. Field studies by Lorange and Murphy (1984) and Goold and Quinn (1993)
indicate that many firms believe that informal strategic control practices are more
appropriate in rapidly-changing environments because of difficulties pre-specifying the
appropriate strategic action plans, targets, and performance measures. Consistent with

these claims, Fiegener (1997) finds that the perceived effectiveness of strategic control
systems is higher in firms following a cost leader strategy than in those following a
differentiation strategy. Moreover, tight strategic controls increase the perceived
effectiveness of strategic control systems in cost leader flrms, but hinder their
effectiveness in differentiators. Similarly, Ittner and Larcker ( 1997) flnd that the
development of formal strategic action plans and formal monitoring of strategic progress
by executives and the board of directors is associated with lower performance in the
dynamic computer industry, and no statistical impact in the automotive industry .

4.5.1 Research Opportunities
Given the mixed results in these studies, an interesting research issue is the
applicability of the v alue-based management concept and related frameworks such as the
balanced scorecard process. Although these frameworks typically are described as being
universally applicable, the strategic control system studies provide evidence that these
concepts may be more beneficial in some competitive and strategic settings than in
others. Goold and Quinn (1993), for example, discuss a number of factors that influence
the choice of strategic control practices, including the length of time-lags between actions
and results, the potential for linkages with other businesses in the flrm 's portfolio, the
level of risk, and the sources of competitive advantage in the business. Researchers can
investigate whether these and other factors actually influence the choice of and benefits
from formal strategic control systems.
A related issue is the role of formal versus informal controls in implementing and
monitoring value-based management systems. The negative results for some of the
formal strategic control practices in the studies discussed above suggest that these

practices can actually be detrimental. Enhanced understanding of the applicability and
performance consequences of formal versus informal control systems in different settings
can make a significant contribution to the managerial accounting literature.
Researchers can also determine whether all six steps in the VBM process are
needed to achieve superior performance. Studies to date have examined only one or a
few of the links in the process, and provide no evidence on whether the broad set ofVBM
practices adds greater value jointly than indiv idually. Progress in understanding the costs
and benefits of managerial accounting practices such as these will require a much broader
perspective that captures the many interdependencies among these practices .
Finally, the question arises as to whether the "new" value-based management
techniques, including related methods such as activ ity-based costing, the balanced
scorecard, and EVA, are fundamentally different than (or superior to) traditional
accounting and control practices or are merely fads promoted by management consultants
and other third-parties. Malmi ( 1999) refers to changes in managerial accounting
practices that are pushed by consultants, business schools, and mass-media publications
as "supply-side" accounting innovations. His study of activity-based costing diffusion in
Finland indicates that the initial ABC adopters implemented the systems in order to
improve efficiency and effectiveness. However, later adopters tended to implement ABC
for ''fashion" or ''fad" reasons encouraged by the widespread promotion of ABC by thirdparties. Additional insight into the adoption, use, and performance implications of
"supply-side" accounting innovations can make a significant contribution to our
understanding of managerial accounting practice.

5. Future Directions
This section presents our views on the steps needed to push managerial accounting
research forward and enhance a study's probability of acceptance in a leading accounting
journal. In particular, we discuss some of the approaches available to address common
problems encountered in managerial accounting research, including motivation and
hypothesis development, sample selection and construct measurement, model
specification, and endogeneity.

5.1 Motivation and Hypothesis D evelopment
For managerial accounting research to advance, researchers must move away
from motiv ating their papers based on enthusiasm in the business press, and must indicate
why the practices or research settings are interesting from a theoretical standpoint.
Consider the current enthusiasm for e-commerce research. Unless researchers can
articulate how this industry contributes to theory development or testing, e-commerce
studies are unlikely to have a lasting impact on accounting research.
In many cases, economic theories cannot fully explain the observed practices.
Instead, researchers must draw upon a broader set of disciplines when developing and
testing hypotheses. Merchant et al. (2000), for example, provide an insightful review of
behavioral and economic approaches to compensation research, and the limitations that
arise when these multiple perspectives are ignored.

5.2 Sample Selection and Construct Measurement
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, commonly used data sources such as public
disclosures, surveys, and third party studies each have strengths and weaknesses.
Researchers must trade off the data sources' relative strengths and weaknesses when

examining a given research question by considering issues such as sample size, data
quality, and data collection costs. More importantly, researchers must attempt to
minimize the weaknesses as much as possible. For example, an extensive literature on
survey research methods exists that can be used to improve the quality of survey-based
accounting studies. Survey researchers can also include more questions requiring "hard"
responses, rather than relying solely on perceptual measures.
Multiple data sources or research methods (e.g., data analysis, interviews, and
experiments) can be used to prov ide a consistent body of evidence that increases the
reader's confidence in the results. 24 Ittner and Larcker (1998b), for example, use
customer-level data from a telecommunications firm, branch-level data from a bank, and
publicly av ailable firm-lev el data to examine the relation between customer satisfaction
measures and future financial performance. Despite the substantial differences in the
three data sets, the analyses yield similar results, suggesting that the fmdings are not
driven by data limitations or sample biases.
In a similar vein, survey data can be combined with hard performance data from
publicly av ailable sources to enhance the credibility of performance tests. For example,
detailed performance data are publicly available for many industries such as banks and
hospitals. Growth in the internet is making even larger volumes of financial and nonfinancial performance data readily accessible to researchers. Replacing self-reported
organizational success measures with actual performance results can help increase the
reputation of survey-based research in the accounting community.
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See Bimberg et al. (1990) for a discussion ofthe advantages of multiple research methods in empirical
managerial accounting research.

Greater use of detailed data from a single or small number of organizations is also
recommended. Although small sample studies will always be subject to complaints about
their generalizability, such studies may provide the only means for obtaining the quantity
and level of data needed to answer many managerial accounting research questions.
Excellent examples of small sample empirical studies in managerial accounting include
Merchant and Manzoni (1989), Anderson (1995), and Banker et al. (1996; 2000).
No matter what data sources are selected, greater effort is needed to deal with
measurement error. Typically, measurement error in the criterion (or dependent) v ariable
leads to reduced statistical power for hypothesis testing, whereas measurement error in
the set of (correlated) predictor (or independent) variables leads to inconsistent parameter
estimates with a bias that generally is difficult to sign. Some managerial accounting
research attempts to demonstrate the psychometric properties of the measures used for
hypothesis testing (e.g., reliability and construct validity).
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The most common approach

is to use a weighted composite of multiple measures for each theoretical construct, after
demonstrating that the selected measures are unidimensional via principal component
analysis and have a sufficiently high Cronbach alpha (see Nunnally [1967] for a
discussion). The primary assumption ofthis approach is that a weighted combination of
related measures will have lower measurement error than any indiv idual measure (i.e.,
exhibit higher reliability).
Another approach that can deal with measurement error and provide evidence on
construct validity (i.e., whether the indicators actually measure what they purport to
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The least sophisticated approach is to use a single indicator for each theoretical construct. Unless the
researcher is very sure that the observed indicator measures the theoretical construct without error
(undoubtedly a very rare occurrence), this approach will almost always be susceptible to inconsistent
parameter estimates.

measure) is latent variable models. Two basic types of latent variable models have been
used in accounting research: maximum likelihood common factor models (see Lambert
and Larcker [1987] for an application) and partial least squares models (see Ittner et al.
[1997] for an application). Each method can provide hypothesis tests using latent
variable estimates that have reasonable reliability and construct validity, thereby
mitigating the inconsistency in parameter estimates from individual variables with
considerable measurement error. Moreover, sophisticated latent variable models can
incorporate simultaneous equation specifications, some time series aspects, and
interactions among the latent variables (Ping, 1996; Li et al., 1998).

5.3Model Specification
A key to improving managerial accounting research is better model specification.
Although model specification should be driven by the theory being tested (Luft and
Shields, 2000), relatively few studies articulate this linkage. Advances in empirical
managerial accounting research not only require these linkages to be made explicit, but
also require researchers to address three major econometric issues: (1) endogeneity, (2)
simultaneity, and (3) functional form. We discuss these issues in the following sections.

5.3.1 Endogeneity
One key limitation in most empirical research is the endogeneity of the predictor
(or independent) variables.
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Endogeneity is caused whenever a predictor is also a choice

variable that is correlated with the random error in the structural model. This
misspecification causes the parameter estimates to be inconsistent, which renders the
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Interestingly, critiques of the managerial accounting literature seem to be much more focused on
endogeneity than other areas of empirical accounting research (e.g., capital marlcets work). However, the
discussion of endogeneity is equally relevant to any type of quasi-experimental research, and is not solely a
managerial accounting limitation.

interpretation of the model and hypothesis tests problematic. The econometric solution to
endogeneity is using a method such as two-stage procedures that rely on instrumental
variables to generate predicted variables that are uncorrelated with the error term. 27
Unfortunately, instrumental variables are very difficult to identify for most managerial
accounting research. Since many organizational choices are interrelated, it is often hard
to identify exogenous instruments that apply to one organizational choice and not to
another. Even in studies that adopt two-stage procedures (e.g., Keating, 1997;
Holthausen et al., 1995), the selected " instruments" also appear to be choice variables
(e.g., "instruments" such as the investment opportunity set, as measured by the market-tobook ratio, are almost certainly endogenous). Thus, regardless of authors' claims or the
apparent sophistication of the methods used in the study, it is an open question as to
whether the typical application of instrumental variable estimation methods causes more
problems than it solves.
Another problem with this econometric approach is that the explanatory power
from the regression of the endogenous variable on all (assumed) exogenous variables is
frequently quite low. As discussed by Nelson and Startz (1990) and Bound et al. (1995),
modest levels of explanatory power produce a variety of undesirable econometric
properties. In particular, the instrumental variable estimates are biased in the same
direction as the OLS estimates. Thus, although the ''textbook solution" to endogeneity is
known, the practical application of instrumental variable estimation to managerial
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Many alternative estimation techniques are available in addition to two-stage least squares (e.g., threestage least squares or maximum-likelihood methods). Given the instrumental variables, two-stage least
squares is simple to implement and has a variety of advantages relative to more complicated methods (e.g.,
Challen and Hagger, 1983).

accounting research is problematic and is likely to produce misleading statements about
the researcher' s ability to address the endogeneity problem.
One particularly difficult endogeneity problem arises when the researcher wants
to assess whether some managerial accounting choice is associated with improved
organizational performance. As discussed in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), if all
organizations in the sample are optimizing with regard to the accounting system choice,
there should be no association between organizational performance and the observed
(endogenous) choice, once the exogenous determinants ofthe choice are controlled in the
structural model. Under this (rather extreme) scenario, empirical researchers should not
even attempt to explain organizational performance because any statistically significant
coefficient on the managerial accounting choice will only occur because of measurement
error, misspecification of functional form, inadequate set of exogenous controls, etc.
Taken to the extreme, managerial accounting researchers using secondary data should
never use performance as the dependent or criterion variable because the results are not
interpretable due to econometric problems caused by endogeneity. 28
From a real world standpoint, it is difficult to believe that the statement
"everybody optimizes all the time" characterizes actual managerial accounting practice.
As Milgrom and Roberts ( 1992, p. 43) note:

Paradoxically, the very imperfections in the rationality of people and in the
adaptability of organizations denied by many simple economic theories are
necessary in proving that rationality-based theories are descriptively and
prescriptively useful. With perfect rationality, one would rarely expect to observe
two organizations in substantially the same circumstances making substantially
different choices, so there would be no possibility of testing what kinds of
organizations perform better.... A more defensible position ... is that people
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This appears to be a very common critique by reviewers in the managerial accounting area. In many
cases, this critique is deemed a "fatal" flaw of the research, and causes the paper to be summarily rejected.

learn to make good decisions and that organizations adapt by experimentation and
imitation, so there is at least ''fossil evidence" available for testing theories.29
Since managerial accounting researchers are ultimately interested in providing at
least some insight into which practices hav e favorable effects on organizational
performance, one approach is to admit that at any given point in time, a cross-sectional
sample (such as that typically used in managerial accounting research) will be composed
of organizations that vary with respect to the optimal level of practice adoption. As
Milgrom and Roberts ( 1992) suggest, all organizations may be dynamically learning and
mov ing toward the optimal level, but a cross-sectional sample will consist of
observations that are distributed around the optimal choice. The observed cross-sectional
variation in practices prov ides a means to assess the performance consequences of
managerial accounting choices.
For example, assume that the research question of interest is whether activitybased costing improves firm performance. In addition, assume that the percentage of
operations using activity-based costing (ranging from zero to 100 percent) is measured
for a cross-section offrrms. This analysis can be conducted in two steps. First, the
researcher can hypothesize and estimate a model for the choice of a managerial
accounting practice (e.g., activity-based costing is commonly hypothesized to be related
to product mix, competition, and other determinants). This model is assumed to be the
same for each firm, exhibits the correct functional form, has predictor variables that are
measured without error, and includes all relevant (exogenous) predictor variables. The
residuals for each observation (either positive or negative) estimate the distance the firm
is off the systematic model describing " optimal" practice. Second, firm performance is
29

Similar ideas have been advanced in the managerial accounting literature. See, for example, Dunk

regressed on the absolute value of these residuals (or perhaps separately for positive and
negative residuals ifthe slope coefficients are expected to be different). If activity-based
costing affects firm performance and firms (on average) have optimally chosen their cost
systems, the coefficient on the absolute value should be negative (i.e., either overinvesting or under-investing in activity-based costing is costly for the firm).

4.3.2 Simultaneity
A related issue is the simultaneous choice of managerial accounting and other
organizational attributes. In theory, organizations should simultaneously select (or
match) their managerial accounting system, organizational design, compensation system,
and other related process and structural aspects of the firm (e.g., Otley, 1980; Milgram
and Roberts, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997a). However, most of the reviewed work
examines these issues by arbitrarily selecting one construct as endogenous (i.e., the
dependent variable) and the remaining constructs as exogenous (i.e., the independent
variables). Alternatively, the few attempts to estimate a non-recursive structural model
simply assume that the instruments needed to identify the system (i.e. , satisfy the rank
and order conditions) are adequate. Unfortunately, as discussed above, many of these
"instruments" do not seem to be exogenous variables that are uncorrelated with the error
terms in the system of equations. Nevertheless, the use of simultaneous equation
approaches to test the theoretical models of managerial accounting can alleviate some of
the simultaneous equation bias. Moreover, although the philosophical basis of causality
is problematic in a cross-sectional setting where the analysis is based solely on the
correlation (or covariance) matrix, structural models involving simultaneous equations

(1989) and Bjornenak (1997).

allow the researcher to assess which hypothesized causal model is actually consistent
with the observed data.

4.3.3 Functional Form
Managerial accounting theories and frameworks often contend that the relations
among accounting and control practices, other organizational design choices, and
performance can be characterized by complex interactions among the practices and nonlinearities (e.g., the costs from more elaborate managerial accounting systems may
exceed the benefits at higher levels of system complexity). This is particularly true of the
frameworks discussed in Section 2, which argue that accounting and control practices
must "match" or "fit" the organization' s environment.
In contrast, the functional form of most prior work is generally a simple linear
structure, typically with few if any interactions among the independent variables.
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Although a linear structure is straightforward to interpret, it may not be sufficient to
capture the complex nature and associated performance consequences of many
managerial accounting problems. For example, it would be useful to know if managerial
accounting practices have the same relation with organization performance over the
entire variable range (i.e., are there backward bending portions of the function?). Giv en
our limited theoretical understanding ofthe appropriate functional form of structural
models related to managerial accounting practices, it seems incumbent on researchers to
entertain alternative specifications and to identify the form consistent with the observed
data.
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Luft and Shields (2000) provide an excellent review of the functional forms used in empirical managerial
accounting research.

One (exploratory) technique that can detect nonlinearities is additive
nonparametric regression (described as "modem regression methods" in Splus, 1991,
chapter 18; Tibshirani, 1988). N onparametric regressions use a variety of smoothing
procedures to flexibly model additive nonlinear relationships between the predictors and
the criterion (or dependent) v ariable. Whereas linear models assume that the criterion
variable is linear in each predictor, additiv e models assume only that each predictor
affects the criterion in a smooth way (see Ittner and Larcker [1998b] for an accounting
application). An advantage of this general approach is that linear structures will be
observed in the statistical and graphical analysis only if they are appropriate (i.e., this
approach w ill not force the researcher to adopt a complex model when it is not
appropriate).
Another promising exploratory technique for dealing with both higher-order
interactions and nonlinearities is recursive partitioning (e.g., Breiman, 1984; Clark and
Pregibon, 1992). Recursiv e partitioning attempts to explain the variation in the criterion
variable by estimating a sequence of partitions of the predictor v ariables. At each step,
the technique splits a subset of the sample into groups by selecting and partitioning the
predictor v ariable that most improv es the homogeneity of the resulting groups. As the
splitting continues, this method generates a tree-like structure of sequential nodes and
branches. For example, the first split in the tree m ay indicate that the v ariable that
explains the most variance in manufacturing plant performance is the use of activitybased costing, with plants in the two upper quartiles of ABC usage displaying the highest
results. However, within the upper quartiles, the splits may indicate that results are
enhanced even further when ABC is accompanied by contingent compensation, but are

reduced when the plant does not allocate decision rights to production workers. In this
way, recursive partitioning has the ability to detect complex, higher-order interactions
that are virtually impossible to hypothesize in an a priori manner. The resulting model
can also be used to assess the likely nonlinear combinations of predictor variables that
yield the greatest performance effects (see Ittner et al. [1999] for a managerial accounting
application).
Finally, dynamic aspects of managerial accounting practices largely have been
ignored in prior studies. Many argue that an organization's environment is best
understood as a highly interdependent system, as opposed to a simple recursive causal
model. For example, important parameters in one part of the performance model can
change in response to shifts in other parts of the organization's internal and external
environment. Feedback loops among parameters can also exist. These issues are almost
impossible to examine in a regression framework, and generally require some type of
system dynamics method (e.g., Forrester, 1961; Senge, 1990). An excellent example of a
system dynamics application in empirical research is the analysis of the performance
effects of total quality management at Analog Devices (Sterman et al., 1997). It would
seem almost impossible to understand the paradox between significant quality
improvements and substantial declines in financial performance experienced by Analog
Devices without closely examining the dynamic, interrelated organizational processes
using methods such as system dynamics. The use of these procedures in managerial
accounting research appears very promising.
6. Conclusions

The objectives of this paper are three-fold: (1) to critically review existing
empirical research in managerial accounting, (2) to highlight some ofthe methodological
shortcoming in these papers, and (3) to offer suggestions for future research. We conduct
our review within the context of a value-based management framework that incorporates
many of the concepts contained in other conceptual models such as contingency theories,
economics-based organizational design frameworks, and the balanced scorecard process.
Although the majority of empirical studies support the associations proposed in these
models, our review also highlights a number of gaps and inconsistencies, providing
natural opportunities for empirical research.
A final observation from our review is the lack of integration between financial
and managerial accounting research. With the possible exception of compensation
studies, accounting researchers have treated these fields as independent, even though it is
likely that these choices do not stand alone. For example, the value-based management
literature argues that the value driver analysis should not only influence the choice of
action plans and the design of control systems, but should also affect external disclosure
requirements (e.g., Black et al., 1998; KPMG Peat Marwick, 1999). This claim is
consistent with calls in the financial accounting community for greater disclose of
information on key value drivers (e.g., American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1994; Wallman, 1995). Without greater integration offinancial and
managerial accounting research, our understanding of the choice and performance
implications of internal and external accounting and control systems is far from complete.
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Table 1
Correlations among strategy proxies for 148 fmancial service frrms. Pearson correlations
above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below. Two-tailed p-values in parentheses.

FLEXIBLE
INNOV
PREDICT
BTOM

FLEXIBLE
1.000
0.490
(0.000)
0.109
(0.188)
-0.084
(0.314)

INNOV
0.499
(0.000)
1.000
0.135
(.102)
-0.040
(0.634)

PREDICT
0.130
(0.118)
0.140
(0.090)
1.000
0.055
(0.516)

BTOM
-0.052
(0.534)
-0.115
(0.170)
-0.082
(0.328)
1.000

BTOM equals the firm's book-to-market ratio, commonly used as an inverse measure of growth
opportunities or innovation strategies. Book-to-market data are obtained from Compustat. Other
data are gathered from a survey of senior financial service executives during the fourth quarter of
1999. FLEXIBLE, INNOV, and PREDICT are developed from principal components analy sis of
11 questions on the firms' strategies and competitiv e environment. FLEXIBLE equals the average
standardized response to four questions asking the respondent's agreement with the statements "We
respond rapidly to early signals of opportunity in our market," "We have greater flexibility to
respond to changes in our environment than our competitors," "We hav e the ability to adjust
capacity within a short period of time," "we have the ability to change product or service offerings
rapidly" (scales ranging from 1 =strongly disagree to 6 =strongly agree). INNOV equals the
average standardized response to four questions asking the respondent's agreement with the
statements "We offer a more expanded range of products and services than our competitors," "We
are frrst to market with new products or services," "We respond rapidly to early signals of
opportunity in our market," and "We expect most of our future growth in profits to come from our
new product and service offerings." PREDICT equals the average standardized response to three
questions asking the respondent's agreement with the statements "We are most active in developing
the markets we currently serve, rather than entering new markets with our products or services,"
"We operate in markets for our products or services that are highly predictable," and " It is easy to
forecast how actions of competitors w ill affect the performance of our organization." One question
asking whether the firm is more cost efficient than its competitors did not load greater than 0.40 on
any factors and is excluded from the analysis.

Table 2
Spearman correlations between the organizational strategy variables and perceived value
drivers in 148 fmancial service frrms. 3

Value Drivers:
Financial
Customer
Employee
Operational
Quality
Alliances
Suppliers
Environmental
Innovation
Community

FLEX

INNOV

0.074
0.037
0.247***
0.069
0.191 **
0.231 ***
0.182**
0.119
0.222***
0.121

0.021
0.174**
0.337***
0.12
0.198**
0.258***
0.299***
0.146*
0.384***
0.127

Strategy
PREDICT
0.111
0.142*
0.142*
0.184**
0.149*
0.041
-0.014
0.144*
0.033
0.173**

BTOM
-0.080
0.060
0.041
0.140*
-0.030
0.132
-0.023
0.104
0.138*
-0.136

a. ** *. * *. * = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels (two-tailed),
respectively.
See Table 1 for the definition of the strategy variables (FLEX, INNOV, PREDICT, and
BTOM) and Figure 4 for the defmition of the value driver categories (Financial, Customer,
Employee, Operational, Quality, Alliances, Suppliers, Environmental, Innovation, and
Community).

Table 3
The reasons for implementing performance evaluation systems, non-management incentive
plans, and stock option plans a

Panel A: The relativ e use of performance evaluations for career development and compensation (1
= exclusively to develop careers, 4 = equally to develop careers and determine compensation, 7 =
ex clusively to determine compensation)
Percentage ofrespondents providing the following scores:
1.0%
2.0%
13.1%
45.3%
25.2%
11.3%
2.0%

2
3
4
5
6
7

Panel B : The importance of possible reasons for adopting non-management incentive plans (%of
respondents).
No
importance
12.5

2
8.0

Moderate
importance
3
20.0

29.3
8.8
8.9

14.8
4.5
8.9

28.3
16.3
25.4

17.7
30.0
32.3

9.9
40.5
24.4

10.5

4.3

19.0

28.2

38.0

31.5
25.2

13.9
13.0

20.6
19.6

21. 1
24.7

12.9
17.4

28.8

19.9

21.1

17.3

12.9

49.0

9.1

13.9

13.0

15.0

40.1
30.4
31.6
4.2

22.0
15. 1
13.5
3.0

21.2
26.0
27. 8
9.9

11.1
19.7
18.0
26.3

5.7
8.8
9.1
56.7

1

Enhance communication of
unit objectiv es
Encourage intrapreneurship
Foster teamwork
Improve morale/employee
relations
Better pay-performance
linkage
Reduce entitlement mentality
Make labor cost more v ariable
with organizational
performance
Become more competitive in
total compensation
Provide method to allocate
awards to high performing
indiv iduals/ teams
Assist in recruiting
Improve employee retention
Upgrade quality of workforce
Improve business performance
and profitability

High
importance

4
27.4

32.0

5

Table 3 (continued)

Panel C: Mean relative rankings ofthe reasons for adopting stock option plans in high
technology firms.b
Retain employees
Provide competitive compensation
Attract employees
Link indiv idual to company performance
Reward past contributions
Encourage stock ownership
Reward project milestones or goals

90.50
74.75
67.22
53.58
36.96
30.29
27.61

a_ Survey data on performance appraisals w ere provided by the consulting firm Watson Wyatt.
Data on non-management incentive plans were provided by the Consortium for Alternativ e
Reward Strategies Research. The consulting firm iQuantic prov ided data on stock option plans in
high technology companies.

b_ Respondents were asked to rank these objectives and to give the same ranking to
objectives with equal importance. The responses were recoded so that a score of 100
would be achieved if an item was ranked most important by all companies.

Table 4
Methods for developing baselines or goals for the perf01mance measures used in non-management incentive plans. The table reports the
percent of respondents who use the measure and develop baselines or goals using that method. a

Historical results
Business plan
Benchmarking
Engineered standard
Government standards
Customer satisfaction surveys
None

a

ACCT
52.2
42.0
13.2
n.a.
0.5
n.a.
11.4

PROD
76.4
17.5
15.6
15.3
n.a.
n.a.
2.1

Type of Measure
QUAL SAFETY ATTEND
67.4
66.2
35.9
17.4
17.5
21.3
15.3
18.8
13.4
5.3
4.5
n.a.
3.2
7.1
n.a.
27.2
n.a.
n.a.
3.5
9.0
30.3

COST
59.1
41.3
10.4
3.1
1.5
n.a.
6.8

VOLUME
61.7
32.6
n.a.c
4.7
n.a.
n.a.
4.7

The data in the table were obtained from surveys conducted by the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies Research.

ACCT = accounting measures, PROD = productivity measures, QUAL = quality and customer measures, SAFETY = safety measures,
ATTEND = attendance measures, COST - cost reduction measures, and VOLUME = volume measures.
b.

c n.a. denotes responses that were not allowed in the survey instrument.
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Figure 4

Mean Perceived Importance of Selected Performance Measurement
Categories from a Survey of 148 Senior-Level Executives of Financial
Service Firms Conducted During the Fourth Quarter of 1999
Perceived I m portancea

aThe respondents answered the following question: "To what extent do y ou view the following categories
of performance measurement as important drivers oflong-term organizational success?" Perceived
importance w as measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not applicable to our organization,
one labeled as not at all important, and six labeled as extremely important. For purposes of coding, a
response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., not at all
important).
The precise definitions for each performance category provided to the survey respondents were: Financial - short-term financial performance (e.g., annual earnings; return on assets), Customer- relations with
customers (e.g., market share; customer satisfaction; customer loyalty/retention), Employee- relations with
employees (e.g., employ ee satisfaction; employee turnover; w ork force capabilities), Operational-operational performance (e.g., productivity; on-time delivery; safety; cycle time), Quality - product and
service quality (e.g., defect rates; refund/returns; quality awards), Alliances- alliance with other
organizations (e.g .. , joint marketing; j oint research and development; joint product design), Suppliers relations with suppliers (e.g., on-time delivery; input into product'service design), Environmental environmental performance (e.g ., EPA citations; environmental compliance), Innovation - product and
service innov ation (e.g., new product development; product development cy cle time), and Communitycommunity (e.g., public image; community involvement).

Figure 5
Mean "Gap" Between Perceived Importance and Use of Selected
Performance Measurement Categories from a Survey of 148 Senior-Level
Executives of Financial Service Firms Conducted During the Fourth Quarter
ofl999

Measurement "Gap"a

t::l Identifying Problems/Developing Action Plans
ffil Evaluating Managerial Performance

Iii Evaluating Capital Investments
•Goals Established

•Measurement "Gap" is the difference betw een the score for the perceived importance of each performance
category and the score for the extent to which the performance category is used for internal decisionmaking or the score for whether formal stmtegic goals are established for each category.
For perceived importance, the respondents answered the following question: "To what extent do you view
the following categories of performance measurement as important drivers oflong-term organizational
success?" Perceived importance was measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not
applicable to our organization, one labeled as not at all important, and six labeled as extremely important.
For purposes of coding, a response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of
one (i.e., not at all important).
For internal decision-making, the respondents answered the following three individual questions: " To what
extent is information pertaining to the following categories used for identifYing problems and improvement
opportunities and developing action plans?; evaluating major capital investment projects?; and evaluating
managerial performance? Usage was measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not
applicable to our organization, one labeled as not used at all, and six labeled as used extensively. For
purposes of coding, a response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of one
(i.e., not used at all).
For goal setting, the respondents answered the following question: "To what extent has your organization
established formal stmtegic objectives (or goals) for the performance categories?" Goal development was
measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not applicable to our organization, one labeled as
no goals established, and six labeled as explicit goals established. A response of zero (i.e., not applicable)
was treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., no goals established).
A respondent organization is assumed to have a zero "gap" if the score for internal usage or goal setting is
greater than or equal to the perceived importance score.
The precise definitions for each performance category provided to the survey respondents w ere: Financial - short-term financial performance (e.g., annual earnings; return on assets), Customer - relations with
customers (e.g., market share; customer satisfaction; customer loyalty/retention), Employee- relations with
employees (e.g. , employee satisfaction; employee turnover; work force capabilities), Operational-operational performance (e.g., productivity; on-time delivery; safety; cycle time), Quality- product and
service quality (e.g., defect mtes; refund/returns; quality awards), Alliances- alliance with other
organizations (e.g .. , joint marketing; joint research and development; joint product design), Suppliersrelations with suppliers (e.g., on-time delivery; input into product/service design), Environmental environmental performance (e.g., EPA citations ; environmental compliance), Innovation - product and
service innovation (e.g., new product development; product development cycle time), and Community community (e.g., public image; community involvement).

Figure 6
Mean Perceived Importance of Selected Performance Measurement
Categories from a Survey of 148 Senior-Level Executives of Financial
Service Firms Conducted During the Fourth Quarter of 1999

Perceived lmportancea I Measurement Qualityb

Em Perceived importance of performance category
~Measurement

quality for performance category

"The respondents answered the following question: "To what extent do you view the following categories
of performance measurement as important drivers oflong-term organizational success?" Perceived
importance w as measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not applicable to our organization,

one labeled as not at all important, and six labeled as extremely important. A response of zero (i.e., not
applicable) w as treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., not at all important).
bThe respondents answered the following question: "How well does your organization measure
information in the following categories?" Measurement quality was measured using a seven-point scale
with zero labeled as not applicable for our organization, one labeled as extremely poor quality of
measurement, and six labeled as high quality of measurement. A response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was
treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., extremely poor quality of measurement).

The precise definitions for each performance category provided to the survey respondents were: Financial - short-term financial performance (e.g., annual earnings; return on assets), Customer- relations with
customers (e.g., market share; customer satisfaction; customer loyalty/retention), Employee- relations with
employees (e.g., employee satisfaction; employee turnover; work force capabilities), Operational-operational performance (e.g., productivity; on-time delivery; safety; cycle time), Quality- product and
service quality (e.g., defect rates; refund/returns; quality awards), Alliances- alliance with other
organizations (e.g .. , joint marketing ; joint research and development; joint product design), Suppliersrelations with suppliers (e.g., on-time deliv ery; input into product/service design), Environmentalenvironmental performance (e.g., EPA citations; environmental compliance), Innovation- product and
service innovation (e.g., new product development; product development cycle time), and Community community (e.g., public image; community involvement).

